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TRIBAL EXCLUSION AUTHORITY: 
ITS SOVEREIGN ROOTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FEDERAL SUPPORT 
By Jeremy Wood*
I. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2013, a plane landed in Qagun Tayagungin, a 
small city at the beginning of the Aleutian chain.1 The city, known 
in English as Sand Point, first emerged in the nineteenth century as 
a fishing post maintained and operated in part by its Aleut residents.2 
On that day in August, those residents gathered to meet the plane 
and formed a semicircle around its exit ramp.3 A man, previously 
identified by the community as a drug-dealer, stepped out.4 When 
he did, the crowd handed him a return ticket and did not let him 
leave the tarmac until he boarded a plane that would take him away 
from the community.5 
Such moments show the necessary role that exclusion, the 
civil act of removing persons from a community space, plays in the 
                                                 
* Jeremy Wood is a judicial law clerk on the Washington Court of Appeals. He 
extends special thanks to Assistant United States Attorney Rebecca Cohen and 
the Honorable J. Michael Diaz, former Assistant United States Attorney and 
current King County Superior Court Judge. While externing for the United 
States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Washington, the author 
drafted several memoranda for Cohen and Judge Diaz. This article grew out of 
two of those memoranda. Thanks are also owed to the talented and dedicated 
staff of the American Indian Law Journal who shepherded this article to 
completion, sharpening and strengthening it along the way. 
1 Dan Joling, In Alaska Village, Banishment Helps Keep Peace, NEWSMINER, 
May 1, 2014, http://www.newsminer.com/news/alaska_news/in-alaska-village-
banishment-helps-keep-peace/article_cc940f74-df60-11e3-8d73-
001a4bcf6878.html [https://perma.cc/FF8W-BH63]. 
2 The History of Sand Point, EXPLORE NORTH, 
http://www.explorenorth.com/library/communities/alaska/bl-SandPoint.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X84Z-2C6W]. 
3 Joling, supra note 1. 
4 Joling, supra note 1. 
5 Joling, supra note 1. 
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tribal repertoire of crime prevention tools.6 As hostile Supreme 
Court precedent has restricted tribal criminal jurisdiction, the 
remedy of exclusion—executed either in an informal, traditional 
manner, as at Sand Point, or through formal civil procedures—
enables tribal governments to keep their communities safe. 
In addition to these jurisdictional restrictions, there are 
statutory limitations on the ability of tribes to issue sentences 
sufficient to fully address epidemic levels of drug dealing, abuse, 
and domestic violence. Sentencing maximums imposed upon tribes, 
pursuant to the Tribal Law and Order Act, pale in comparison to 
those available to state and federal judges.7 
The first purpose of this article is to bolster exclusion’s 
potential to fill those spaces where Supreme Court precedent and 
statutes limit tribal jurisdiction and sentencing authority. Tribes 
have created careful legal schemes to administer exclusion, to which 
the federal courts should defer. The United States federal 
government should also further tribal exclusion efforts by 
prosecuting violations of exclusion orders and implementing policy 
to require that prosecutors charge such cases. 
At the same time, exclusion is a stark remedy, and its effect 
on those excluded is severe. When imposed upon tribal members, it 
can entail a loss of community, family, and heritage. The second 
purpose of this article is to highlight the sensitive attention that tribal 
legislators and courts have paid to these concerns. Rather than 
second-guessing these tribal initiatives, federal actors should 
support their furtherance by deferring to tribal decisions. 
This article is presented in four parts. Part Two examines the 
practice of exclusion in the tribal context. It considers the pressures 
that led to a modern resurgence in the use of exclusion as well as the 
efforts of tribal lawmakers to procedurally regulate it. Amongst 
those lawmakers, tribal legislators have promulgated statutes that 
delineate the offenses subject to exclusion, the rights of the 
excluded, and the proper jurisdictional framework for the practice’s 
exercise. 
                                                 
6 The relevant authorities and discussion characterize this practice as both 
exclusion and banishment. Notwithstanding minor distinctions some have raised 
between the terms, this article uses “exclusion” for purposes of consistency. 
7 See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 202, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2016). Pursuant 
to § 1302(b), tribal courts may sentence “defendant[s] to term of imprisonment 
greater than 1 year but not to exceed 3 years for any 1 offense.” 
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Part Three turns to United States federal law. It first 
considers the common law’s traditional recognition of a sovereign’s 
power of exclusion as a necessary incident of the police power. 
Early on, federal courts acknowledged that same power in tribal 
governments.8 This part then examines how this recognition and 
other circumstances led the United States to enter into treaties with 
tribal nations to protect this power of exclusion. Part Three ends by 
following the decline of this recognition, when policies of allotment 
devastated the tribal land base and the Supreme Court sapped the 
force of the exclusion power along with it. 
Part Four considers the important work the United States 
executive and legislative branches have done in recent years to 
support the exclusion power. Various United States Attorney’s 
Offices have prosecuted individuals who enter tribal lands in 
violation of a tribal exclusion order.9 By continuing to do so, they 
would further the United States’ trust obligation to protect tribal 
nations from hostile settler encroachment. This part also details 
recent congressional efforts to reaffirm an expanded tribal power of 
exclusion in the prosecution of domestic violence offenses, a power 
that may eventually be applied in the prosecution of drug-related 
offenses and those related to violence against children. 
Part Five turns to the courts and presents, in three sections, 
how current jurisprudence might develop to support tribes in 
exercising the power of exclusion. The first section considers how 
courts might better recognize the necessary tribal jurisdiction to 
impose exclusion. They can do so by resting such jurisdiction either 
on inherent tribal sovereignty or through interpreting the holding in 
United States v. Montana. The second section examines the effect 
of federal public accommodations statutes on tribal exclusion 
power. It stresses thoughtful caution when application of such law 
would impair treaty exclusion rights. And it examines how, in the 
commercial context, access to tribal commercial spaces may not 
implicate intramural tribal affairs, but tribal regulation of that access 
certainly does. In the last section, this article considers recent 
                                                 
8 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 593, (1823); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 
384, 391–92 (1904). 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, No. CR 14-30038-MAM, 2014 WL 
4185360, at *1 (D.S.D. Aug. 20, 2014); see also Press Release, United States 
Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of South Dakota, Man 
Charged with Criminal Trespass (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sd/pr/man-charged-criminal-trespass [https://perma.cc/792A-BA8F]. 
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decisions on habeas corpus petitions brought by excluded persons. 
Based on these cases, the article suggests that federal district courts 
should decline to exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction in challenges 
to the exclusion of nonmembers, should defer to tribal procedural 
protections, and should avoid conclusions that imply that tribes 
should change their law. 
II. TRIBAL EXCLUSION PRACTICES 
Tribes inherently enjoy the power of exclusion, and they 
maintain that power unless it is abrogated by Congress. Many tribal 
governments have recognized the customary roots of exclusion in 
their legal heritage. The Nisqually and Tohono O’odham Tribes 
have done so in appellate opinions, recognizing that the practice of 
exclusion predates modern tribal organization.10 The Snoqualmie 
Tribe, by constitutional provision, limits the exclusion of tribal 
members “in accord with Snoqualmie tribal tradition.”11 Amongst 
the Cheyenne people, traditional soldier societies continue to 
implement informal extrajudicial exclusions.12 
Tribal nations have employed this practice since time 
immemorial. Three examples are helpful. At some point between the 
twelfth and fifteenth centuries, the Iroquois Nations of the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy promulgated their constitution, the 
Gayanashagowa, or Great Law of Peace, which as Congress has 
acknowledged, served to inspire the framers of the United States 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Stepetin v. Nisqually Indian Cmty., 2 N.I.C.S. App. 224, 234 
(Nisqually Tribal Ct. App. 1993), 
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/NICS/html/2NICSApp/2NICSApp224.htm
l [https://perma.cc/3HZN-9F94]; Escalante v. Sells Dist. Council, No. CTA-
0133 (Tohono O’odham Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2017), at 10, 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/2017-01-27-decision-of-appeal-
003.pdf [https://perma.cc/66TP-U52Z]. 
11 SNOQUALMIE TRIBAL CONST. art. II, § 3, 
http://www.snoqualmietribe.us/sites/default/files/linkedfiles/constitution.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B9FP-GV7M]. 
12 Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal 
Legal Systems, 37 N.M. L. REV. 85, 95 (2007). These societies could banish 
those found guilty of murder, disobedience of the orders of a traditional society, 
theft, rape, incest, or abuse of power. Id. In 2005 the Dog Soldiers of the Crazy 
Dog Society and the Kit Fox Society decided at council to banish an Indian 
Health Services doctor for performing religious ceremonies on tribal land in a 
manner that caused “sacrilege and desecration to [their] culture.”12 Id. at 96 
(alteration in original). The Dog Soldiers drove the doctor, a nonmember, to the 
border of the reservation and ordered him to leave. Id. The Northern Cheyenne 
Tribal Court, however, overturned this traditional banishment. Id. 
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Constitution.13 Section twenty of that instrument authorizes the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy leadership to banish a chief from all 
Haudenosaunee territory for the crime of murder .14 Section seventy-
four permits the same sanction to be imposed upon adopted 
members of the confederated nations who cause a disturbance.15 
Similarly, one scholar of Cherokee law has noted that the Cherokee 
Nation possibly authorized exclusion as a sanction for violations of 
“food and field regulations, refusal to work, [or failure to] contribute 
[the proper] share of work and crops.”16 
Under traditional Cheyenne law, community chiefs could 
order the exclusion of a person who committed murder or drove 
another person to suicide.17 Otherwise, the continued presence of the 
guilty party was thought to cause continuing danger to community 
welfare and emotional harm to the victim’s family.18 If the chiefs 
were absent, the military societies could order an emergency 
exclusion under certain circumstances.19  
Exclusion was not a death sentence. Those excluded 
generally found a hospitable and unquestioning reception in 
neighboring tribes.20 Amongst the Cheyenne themselves, such 
resident aliens were protected from harm.21 But homesickness, 
understandably, still affected the excluded.22 
Also, exclusion was not necessarily permanent. Although 
exclusion orders were phrased for an indefinite duration, they were 
regularly commuted after five to ten years.23 For example, in 
deciding whether to allow readmission, the Cheyenne community 
leadership considered the excluded person’s penitence and 
character, the safety of the community, and the mitigating factors of 
                                                 
13 See H.R. Con. Res. 331, 100th Cong. (1988); Robert B. Porter, Building a 
New Longhouse: The Case for Government Reform Within the Six Nations of the 
Haudenosaunee, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 805, 814–16 (1998). 
14 GREAT LAW OF PEACE § 20, 
http://cscie12.dce.harvard.edu/ssi/iroquois/simple/1.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/5A6P-5MKB]. 
15 Id. at § 74. 
16 RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN 
TO COURT 36 (1975). 
17 KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: 
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 166–67 (1941). 
18 See id. at 133. 
19 Id. at 166–67. 
20 Id. at 133. 
21 Id. at 166. 
22 Id. at 133. 
23 Id. at 137. 
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the underlying offense.24 Readmission also required the consent of 
the military societies and the victim’s representatives.25 Even once 
readmitted, the once-excluded individual was permanently barred 
from certain Cheyenne rituals and sacred spaces.26 
Notable Professor Karl Llewelyn praised this exclusion 
scheme, characterizing it as “a technique of multiple excellence.”27 
It discouraged revenge, rehabilitated the offender, and allowed for 
restoration of right relations “when dangers of social disruption 
were over.”28 
In the nineteenth century, several tribes adopted 
constitutions to codify traditional powers of exclusion, including the 
Delaware, Sisseton-Wahpeton, and Pamunkey Nations.29 Many of 
the relevant provisions specifically addressed the exclusion of white 
nonmembers who refused to obey tribal law or who committed acts 
of sexual exploitation against tribal members. 
In recent years, tribes have increasingly turned to exclusion 
to address crises not amenable to other measures.30 United States 
law and the narrow powers it recognizes in tribes failed many of 
these communities. Reliance on exclusion, one Haudenosaunee 
journalist explained, comes “out of desperation.”31 The “American 
route, which has proven to be a failure” requires replacement by 
“ancestral discipline.”32 
For example, many tribes have turned to exclusion to 
confront drug-dealing epidemics. This problem exploded in recent 
decades. The Lummi Tribe faces an OxyContin trade estimated at 
$2 million per annum, “easily surpassing fishing industry profits.”33 
Discussing the plague of drugs on his reservation, Lummi Tribal 
Chairman Darrel Hillaire explained, “We need to go back to our old 
                                                 
24 Id. at 167–68. 
25 Id. at 167. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 158. 
28 Id. 
29 DAVID E. WILKINS & SHELLY HULSE WILKINS, DISMEMBERED: NATIVE 
DISENROLLMENT AND THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 50–51 (2017). 
30 Id. at 68–71 (identifying twenty-six tribal communities in twenty states that 
have ordered exclusions). 
31 Sarah Kershaw & Monica Davey, Plagued by Drugs, Tribes Revive Ancient 






ways . . .We had to say enough is enough.”34 The Yupik residents of 
Akiak in Southwest Alaska have struggled against the state’s foot-
dragging in combatting their community’s drug problem. When 
asked about the lack of support from local state law enforcement, 
those residents explained, “If they do not enforce [tribal banishment 
orders] we will enforce [them] ourselves. We will get a group of 
men together and go to that person and tell him to leave and to not 
come back.”35 Amongst other tribes, the Cheyenne River Sioux, 
Standing Rock Sioux, and Saginaw Chippewa of Michigan have all 
acted to exclude drug dealers from their reservations.36 
Exclusion also allows tribes to combat ills that non-Indian 
sovereigns are not forced to face. In one noted case, a tribe used 
exclusion to remove a nonmember who stole and reported tribal 
traditions for his own academic gain. Tito Naranjo, a professor at 
the University of New Mexico, is a member of the Santa Clara 
Pueblo married to a woman from the Taos Pueblo.37 He received the 
opportunity to watch the Taos Deer Dance at Christmas.38 Without 
asking the Taos for permission and knowing it would likely not be 
granted, he wrote an essay to run in a local newspaper.39 In his 
words, he would have been a “wimp” to defer to the concerns of the 
Taos community.40 In response, a Taos spiritual leader filed a 
complaint in tribal court calling for Naranjo’s exclusion.41 The 
petition was granted.42 
                                                 
34 Id. 
35 Joling, supra note 1. 
36 Levi Rickert, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe to Banish Meth Dealers from Tribe, 
NATIVE NEWS Online (Jul. 29, 2015), 
http://nativenewsonline.net/currents/standing-rock-sioux-tribe-to-banish-meth-
dealers-from-tribe/ [https://perma.cc/8FPF-K4YH]; Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribal Council Votes to Banish Drug Dealers for Life from Tribe, NATIVE NEWS 
ONLINE, (Jul. 9, 2015), http://nativenewsonline.net/currents/cheyenne-river-
sioux-tribal-council-votes-to-banish-drug-dealers-for-life-from-tribe/ 
[https://perma.cc/DZ2W-S5CU]; Press Release, Banishment, SAGINAW 
CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE, (Feb. 25, 2015), 
http://sagchip.org/news.aspx?newsid=309#.WqgYYGrwaUk 
[https://perma.cc/EWK5-BNH2]. 
37 Marissa Stone, Dancing with Fire: Santa Clara Tribal Member Banished from 
Taos Pueblo for Writing Essay About Tribe's Sacred Deer Dance, SANTA FE 









Tribes have also used exclusion to combat racism exhibited 
by non-Indians towards tribal members. In 2015, the Fort Peck tribal 
council passed a resolution to exclude Former School 
Superintendent Kim Hardin after Hardin sent an email to another 
non-Native teacher in which she referred to Native teachers as 
“renegades.”43 One of the councilmembers who moved for her 
exclusion reported that Hardin’s actions had created a racial divide 
in the community.44 By excluding such a person, the Tribe defended 
the dignity of its people from the bigotry of nonmembers.  
The frequency with which exclusion is applied varies across 
tribes. One New Mexico attorney reported that she only dealt with a 
handful of exclusion orders in her twenty-five years of practice.45 
By contrast, the Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
excluded seventy-seven people from 2001 to 2014.46 In a similar 
period, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians excluded sixty-two 
people.47 The Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa uses 
exclusion not only as a tool to remove offenders but also to shame 
them as examples by posting their names online.48 
Recognizing the impact of exclusion, tribal lawmakers based 
exclusion statutes on a careful balancing of individual due process 
and community welfare. 
A. Tribal Exclusion Statutes 
Many tribes have enacted statutes providing for exclusion. 
The National Congress of American Indians has urged all tribes to 
enact such legislation.49 A brief survey of tribal exclusion 
                                                 
43 Aja Goare, Montana School Superintendent Fired, Banished From 
Reservation, KTVQ (May 1, 2015), 
http://www.ktvq.com/story/29137083/eastern-montana-school-superintendent-
fired-banished-for-alleged-racism [https://perma.cc/U2XN-YL7Y] (The term 
“renegade” when applied to Native individuals is widely considered a slur; it 
derives from western American characterizations of Native people who refused 
to relocate onto reservations.). 
44 Id. 
45 T.S. Last, More Tribes Bring Back Sentence of Banishment, ALBUQUERQUE J. 
(Jun. 24, 2016), https://www.abqjournal.com/797280/more-tribes-bring-back-
sentence-of-banishment.html [https://perma.cc/GSU7-TLLR]. 
46 Id. (Excluded tribal members were allowed to retain their membership).  
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 National Congress of American Indians, Res. SD-15-053, Enforcement of 
Exclusion Orders, Protective Orders, and Trespass Violations in Indian 
Country, at 2 (2015), http://www.ncai.org/resources/resolutions/enforcement-of-
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ordinances shows points of similarity and difference in the ways 
different tribes have chosen to codify the power to exclude. The 
following examination focuses on such points as they are related to 
statements of legislative intent, the class of persons subject to 
exclusion, the classes of offenses that justify exclusion, tribal efforts 
to overcome jurisdictional hurdles, and statutory due process 
requirements. 
1. Statements of Legislative Intent 
Statements of legislative intent found in tribal codes shed 
light on the policies underlying tribal exclusion ordinances. The 
Makah Tribal Code, for example, explains that the exclusion 
ordinance was passed because nonmembers “[were] increasingly 
acting in utter disregard of Tribal law,” destroying and polluting 
tribal resources, trespassing on tribal property, and harming “the 
natural, social and psychological well-being of members and all 
persons on the Reservation.”50 Similarly, the Tulalip Tribal Code 
takes note of “population increases on and in the vicinity of the 
Tulalip Indian Reservation” associated with its extensive 
commercial developments.51 Although such developments have 
brought substantial economic benefits and improved Tulalip tribal 
relationships with neighboring communities, they have also allowed 
for new forms of personal and property crime.52 As a result, the 
Tulalip code notes a “greater number of instances in which it may 
be necessary to exercise its exclusion power.”53 The Pascua Yaqui 
                                                 
exclusion-orders-protective-orders-and-trespass-violations-in-indian-country 
[https://perma.cc/7VYF-7ZGD]. 
50 MAKAH TRIBAL CODE § 9.1.01, 
https://www.narf.org/nill/codes/makahcode/makahlawt9.html 
[https://perma.cc/QKX6-ULQF]. 
51 TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.010(2), 
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/Tulalip/?Tulalip02/Tulalip0240.html&?f 
[https://perma.cc/Q4QR-89P4]. The Tulalip Tribes maintain extensive gaming 
and retail businesses which employ many non-Indian workers and which draw 
customers from throughout the Pacific Northwest, Canada, and further abroad. 
See Richard Walker, Feds Side with Tulalip Tribes in Quil Ceda Tax Fight, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Aug. 12, 2015), 
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/politics/feds-side-with-tulalip-
tribes-in-quil-ceda-tax-fight/ [https://perma.cc/6M4K-NS8B]. 
52 E.g., Tulalip Police searching for suspects in armed robbery at Seattle 
Premium Outlet Mall, MARYSVILLE GLOBE (May 28, 2010), 
https://blog.seattlepi.com/marysville-pi/2010/05/28/tulalip-police-searching-for-
suspects-in-armed-robbery-at-seattle-premium-outlet-mall/. 
53 TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.010(2). 
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Tribal Code roots its exclusion authority in the “sacred duty and 
obligation,” recognized in the tribal constitution, of the Tribe to 
protect natural, economic, cultural, and social resources.54 The 
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs’ tribal code roots its 
exclusion authority in treaty language providing that the tribal 
reservation “shall be set apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed and 
marked out for [the Tribes’] exclusive use; nor shall any white 
person be permitted to reside upon the same without” tribal and 
federal permission.55 
2. Persons Subject to Exclusion and Offenses That  
Justify Exclusion 
Tribal exclusion codes designate persons whom a tribe may 
exclude and the offenses for which those persons may be excluded. 
While some tribes only permit the exclusion of nonmembers,56 there 
are others that allow exclusion to be applied broadly with few 
exceptions, such as those authorized to remain on reservation by 
federal law57 or those who retain real property on the reservation58. 
In surveying tribal constitutions, Professor David Wilkins identified 
thirty-two codes that authorized the exclusion of nonmembers who 
threaten a tribe’s well-being and thirty codes that authorized the 
exclusion of any person not legally entitled to remain on tribal 
lands.59 
Tribal codes allow for exclusion as a remedy for a broad host 
of offensive conduct. Beyond general violations of tribal law, these 
offenses include those affecting a tribe’s natural resources, 
                                                 
54 PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE, tit. 5, ch. 8, § 10, http://www.pascuayaqui-
nsn.gov/_static_pages/tribalcodes/. 
55 WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE § 300.1 (quoting Treaty with the Tribes of 
Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963), https://warmsprings-
nsn.gov/government/tribal-code/. 
56 E.g., CHEHAILIS TRIBAL CODE § 2.20.030, 
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/ChehalisTribe/; MAKAH LAW AND ORDER 
CODE § 9.2.01, https://www.narf.org/nill/codes/makahcode/; PORT GAMBLE 
S’KLALLAM TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE § 22.01.03, 
https://www.pgst.nsn.us/government/law-and-order-code. 
57 E.g., COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE § 3-2-3, https://www.cct-
cbc.com/current-code/; COQUILLE TRIBAL ORDINANCES § 652.375(2)(a), 
http://www.coquilletribe.org/?page_id=1326; NEZ PERCE TRIBAL CODE § 4-4-2, 
http://www.nezperce.org/~code/pdf%20convert%20files/14feb17%20Code%20
with%20TOC.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9CL-GDTF]. 
58 E.g., COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE § 3-2-3; NEZ PERCE TRIBAL 
CODE § 4-4-2. 
59 WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 29, at 53.  
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economic welfare, and cultural integrity as well as the laws of other 
jurisdictions. 
The first category includes the unauthorized exploitation of 
game, fish, timber, other vegetation, and mineral resources.60 It also 
includes trespassing on protected lands closed to all persons or 
nonmembers by a respective tribal government.61 By using 
exclusion to address these offenses tribes may regain control of 
resources that carry deep cultural and financial value and that have 
often been prime targets for exploitation by non-Indians. 
The second category aims at the sort of economic 
exploitation too often attributable to nontribal members in Indian 
country. Thus, the Tulalip, Chehalis, Colville, Warm Springs, and 
Port Gamble S’Klallam tribes allow for the exclusion of those 
committing fraud and usury as well as those who refuse to comply 
with tribal business or employment regulations.62 Other tribes may 
exclude those who refuse to pay tribal taxes; an issue of historic 
contention in compliance.63 As discussed earlier, commerce in drugs 
poses an acute threat to tribal communities. Recognizing this threat, 
the Tulalip legislature enacted a mandate requiring the Tribe to 
petition for the permanent exclusion for offenses related to the 
production or sale of drugs.64 
The third category aims at persons like Tito Naranjo who 
seek to colonize, exploit, or denigrate tribal culture. Thus, the 
Pascua Yaqui Tribe allows for the exclusion of those found 
“conducting any sociological or anthropological studies without 
                                                 
60 E.g., COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE § 3-2-4(a)(8); COQUILLE 
TRIBAL ORDINANCES §§ 652.150(1), 652.375(1)(b); MAKAH LAW AND ORDER 
CODE § 9.2.02(j); PORT GAMBLE S’KLALLAM TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE 
§ 22.02.01(h), (i); TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.050(12). 
61 E.g., NEZ PERCE TRIBAL CODE § 4-4-3(c); TULALIP TRIBAL CODE 
§ 2.40.030(2). 
62 E.g., CHEHALIS TRIBAL CODE § 2.20.050(N), (O), (R), 
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/ChehalisTribe/; COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW 
AND ORDER CODE § 3-2-4(6); COQUILLE TRIBAL ORDINANCES § 652.375(1)(c); 
NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 17, ch. 5, § 1901(C)(2)(d), (e), 
http://www.navajonationcouncil.org/Code%20Page.html; NEZ PERCE TRIBAL 
CODE § 4-4-3(f), (g); PORT GAMBLE S’KLALLAM TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER 
CODE § 22.02.01(k), (n), (o), (p); TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.050(18), (20); 
WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE § 300.310(10)– (12). 
63 E.g., CHEHALIS TRIBAL CODE § 2.20.050(L); COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND 
ORDER CODE § 3-2-4(4); NEZ PERCE TRIBAL CODE § 4-4-3(d); TULALIP TRIBAL 
CODE § 2.40.050(16); WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE § 300.310(4); see Merrion 
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144–45 (1982). 
64 TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.050(26); see WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE 
§ 300.310(16). 
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prior tribal council permission.”65 The Chehalis and Port Gamble 
S’Klallam tribal codes similarly allow for the exclusion of those 
found “[c]onducting missionary activities without permission of the 
Business Committee.”66 Such an enactment mirrors those of foreign 
jurisdictions historically plagued by violent proselytism.67 Because 
these harms are acutely tied to histories of colonial exploitation, it 
is proper that tribes should have the power to resist them and to do 
so through the mechanism of exclusion. 
The fourth category of offenses warranting exclusion—
violations of other jurisdictions’ laws—allows tribes to better 
cooperate with neighboring jurisdictions in creating a consistent 
criminal overlay. Many tribes regularly order exclusions for 
violations of state and federal laws, as well as the laws of other 
tribes, even if they are not prosecuted in another jurisdiction.68 Many 
tribes similarly allow for the exclusion of individuals found evading 
the authorities of other jurisdictions.69 The Tulalip code also allows 
for the exclusion of registered sex offenders, regardless of where the 
underlying sex offense or registration requirement arose.70 
Similarly, Chehalis and Port Gamble S’Klallam tribal codes allow 
for the exclusion of juvenile nonmembers hiding in tribal lands in 
order to avoid school attendance elsewhere.71 The constitutions of 
the Shoalwater and Skokomish tribes permit the exclusion and 
extradition of individuals accused of crimes in other jurisdictions.72 
The jurisdictional pitfalls of federal Indian law can make it 
difficult for tribes to address these harms, even through exclusion. 
Through smart drafting, tribal legislatures seek to overcome these 
                                                 
65 PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE tit. 5, ch. 8, § 50(B)(1); see CHEHALIS TRIBAL 
CODE § 2.20.050(Q); NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 17, ch. 5, § 1901)(C)(2)(c); 
NEZ PERCE TRIBAL CODE § 4-4-3(i); TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.050(1). 
66 CHEHALIS TRIBAL CODE § 2.20.050(W); see PORT GAMBLE S’KLALLAM 
TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE § 22.02.01(aa). 
67 See, e.g., Penal Law, 5737–1977, §§ 170–174, LSI 54 (1977) (Isr.). 
68 E.g., CHEHALIS TRIBAL CODE § 2.20.050(B); PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE 
tit. 5, ch. 8, § 50(A); TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.050(4), (5). 
69 E.g., CHEHALIS TRIBAL CODE § 2.20.050(C); TULALIP TRIBAL CODE 
§ 2.40.050(6). 
70 TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.050(13); see Allie Hostler, Hoopa Tribe Starts 
Banishment Process of Non-tribal Member Sex Offenders, TWO RIVERS TRIB. 
(May 29, 2013), www.tworiverstribune.com/2013/05/hoopa-tribe-starts-
banishment-process-of-non-tribal-member-sex-offenders/ 
[https://perma.cc/BQ6Q-UJSJ]. 
71 CHEHALIS TRIBAL CODE § 2.20.050(U); PORT GAMBLE S’KLALLAM TRIBAL 
LAW AND ORDER CODE § 22.02.01(w). 
72 WILKINS & WILKINS, supra note 29, at 53. 
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pitfalls and to enlist the support of other sovereigns in furthering 
tribal welfare. 
3. Statutory Efforts to Overcome Jurisdictional  
Limitations 
Tribal codes address the complex jurisdictional doctrines 
tribes navigate to protect their communities. Many of these codes 
reflect the perspective that exclusion as a civil remedy allows a 
broad exercise of jurisdiction. The Chehalis exclusion ordinance 
makes this utility explicit in permitting the exclusion of those who 
violate the tribal code “whether or not the Tribe has jurisdiction to 
prosecute the person for the act.”73 This allows the Confederated 
Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation to exclude, for example, non-
Indians over whom it may not have criminal jurisdiction.74 
As discussed below, other tribes have incorporated the 
United States Supreme Court’s test for tribal civil jurisdiction, as 
pronounced in United States v. Montana. Pursuant to that test, tribes 
may exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on nonmember fee 
land that is located within the bounds of a reservation in two 
instances.75 The first arises when the nonmember has entered a 
consensual relationship with a tribe or its members.76 The second 
arises when the nonmember’s conduct threatens “the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.”77 The Nez Perce Tribal Code paraphrases this same language 
to allow exclusion of anyone “doing or attempting to do any act 
upon the reservation which unlawfully threatens the peace, health, 
safety, morals or general welfare of the tribe, its members, or other 
persons.”78 Similarly, the Colville code deems exclusion a proper 
remedy for an offense that “substantially threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, institutional process, 
economic security or health or welfare of the Colville Confederated 
Tribes, its members or reservation residents.”79 This language 
warrants the respect of nonmember judiciaries, for it serves as a 
                                                 
73 CHEHALIS TRIBAL CODE § 2.20.050(A). 
74 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
75 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981). 
76 Id. at 565. 
77 Id. at 566. 
78 NEZ PERCE TRIBAL CODE § 4-4-3(a). 
79 COLVILLE LAW AND ORDER CODE § 3-2-4 (1979). 
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legislative determination of what conduct meets the Montana 
exceptions. 
Tribal exclusion codes also allow for intergovernmental 
collaboration when limitations on tribal jurisdiction bar the 
prosecution of certain offenders. For example, the Pascua Yaqui 
Tribal Code authorizes the tribal prosecutor to refer cases to the 
office of the United States Attorney.80 The Confederated Tribes of 
the Warm Springs permits the referral of cases to the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, the United States Attorney, and state prosecutors.81 
And the Coquille Tribal Code authorizes the council to enter 
“cooperative intergovernmental law enforcement agreements” to 
enforce both its exclusion and trespass ordinances.82 
Notwithstanding this demonstrated commitment to ensuring 
that tribal law is enforced, those tribes that have enacted exclusion 
ordinances have incorporated extensive due process protections. 
4. Statutory Due Process 
Notwithstanding the keen concern tribal lawmakers have for 
public safety, they have shown similar vigilance in ensuring due 
process. Outside certain narrow circumstances, many tribal codes 
place the burden of proving the propriety of exclusion on the tribe.83 
Tribal codes also generally affirm rights to notice and hearing, 
counsel, and appeal.84 These rights may be curtailed for certain 
classes of offenders, such as those offenders found guilty of 
domestic violence.85 Yet tribes do not ignore the continuing social 
bond the excluded person may hold with the tribal community. For 
example, the Tulalip code recognizes that excluded persons may 
                                                 
80 PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE tit. 5, ch. 8, § 110(A). 
81 WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE § 300.800. 
82 COQUILLE TRIBAL CODE § 652.800. 
83 E.g., COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE § 3-2-6(b); NEZ PERCE 
TRIBAL CODE § 4-4-5(b); PORT GAMBLE S’KLALLAM TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER 
CODE § 22.04.08. 
84 E.g., COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE §§ 3-2-6, 3-2-7; NEZ PERCE 
TRIBAL CODE §§ 4-4-5, 4-4-6; PORT GAMBLE S’KLALLAM TRIBAL LAW AND 
ORDER CODE § 22.04.04; TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.070. Tribes may have 
curtailed the scope of appellate review. For example, the Port Gamble S’Klallam 
Tribal code permits appeal only of whether the tribal council followed the 
procedural requirements for exclusion. § 22.06.02. And it requires an excluded 
appellant to show not only a procedural failure, but resultant prejudice. 
§ 22.06.04(b). 
85 TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 2.40.170(3). Recall the precedent in Cheyenne 
traditional law for emergency exclusion by the military societies. See supra 
body of text accompanying note 19. 
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nonetheless enter the reservation to attend the funeral of a family 
member, absent a substantial threat of harm to the community.86 
The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs has crafted 
separate procedural schemes for the exclusion of resident versus 
nonresident nonmembers. It has done so in recognition of the fact 
that an increasing number of nonresidents have entered the 
reservation to traffic illegal drugs, whereas nonmember residents 
typically work for the Confederated Tribes or the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs and have strong social ties with the tribal community.87 
Nonresidents “are not legally entitled to reside on the 
Reservation.”88 In addition to enumerated reasons similar to those 
discussed above,89 nonresidents may be excluded for “[failing] to 
establish a legitimate purpose for [their] presence on the territory of 
The Confederated Tribes.”90 The Confederated Tribes’ burden to 
justify exclusion is low, and a nonresident may not appeal his or her 
exclusion.91 By contrast, a resident may only be excluded for the 
reasons discussed above in section II.A.2, the burden is higher, and 
he or she may appeal his or her exclusion.92 These procedural 
protections demonstrate the respect these tribes have shown for the 
rights of residents facing exclusion. These procedural protections 
should encourage non-tribal governments to respect tribes in 
exercising their exclusion authority. 
Tribal courts tasked with the interpretation and application 
of these procedural requirements are developing a rich body of case 
law on due process in the exclusion context. 
B. Exclusion in Tribal Court 
Tribal courts of appeals have developed rich case law 
concerning exclusion.93 The tension between two broad themes, the 
                                                 
86§ 2.40.130. 
87 WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE §§ 300.300, 300.400. 
88 § 300.300. 
89 See supra Section II.A.2. 
90 WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE § 300.310(17). 
91 §§ 300.315, 300.345. 
92 §§ 300.415, 300.445. 
93 The Snoqualmie Tribe is a notable exception, failing to provide for judicial 
process in exclusion. Pursuant to Article II of the Snoqualmie Tribe’s 
constitution, tribal or general council is the “sole determinate of . . . banishment 
actions [which] are matters within the exclusive internal sovereignty of the 
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe and not justiciable in any court of law.” CONST. OF THE 
SNOQUALMIE TRIBE OF INDIANS, art. II, § 5. This nonjusticiability, however, has 
drawn ire from the federal courts. In mid-2008, the Snoqualmie Tribal Council 
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respect for the due process rights of the excluded and the necessity 
to protect tribal communities, rives this case law. 
1. Due Process Rights 
Recognizing the “significant impact on the excluded 
individual [and their] spouse and children,” tribal appellate courts 
have insisted upon the protection of the due process rights of the 
excluded.94 In doing so, they have taken to task tribal trial courts, 
executives, and legislatures. 
Due process requires allowing the excluded to challenge 
their exclusion. A recent case from the Tohono O’odham Court of 
Appeals shows the seriousness with which tribal judiciaries take this 
right.95 Stephanie Escalante and Nolan Lopez, both tribal members, 
lived on the Tohono O’odham reservation.96 Police received reports 
of illegal activity at Escalante’s property.97 In response, the local 
district council voted to banish Escalante and Lopez permanently.98 
When Escalante tried to reenter the reservation to retrieve her 
grandchildren’s medical records, she was arrested and incarcerated 
for sixty days.99 
Escalante and Lopez sued in tribal court to contest the 
validity of their exclusions, but the trial court dismissed the action, 
holding that the Tribe’s sovereign immunity deprived the courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction.100 On review, the court of appeals 
explained that this ruling diverged from tribal law.101 The Tohono 
                                                 
passed a resolution banishing nine tribal members, including a former chairman, 
for treason. Sweet v. Hinzman, No. C08-844JLR, 2009 WL 1175647, at *1 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2009) (The banishees could not challenge such action 
within the tribe because they lacked a court and the constitution rendered their 
banishment a nonjusticiable political question; they therefore filed a petition for 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington). 




95 Escalante v. Sells Dist. Council, No. CTA-0133 (Tohono O’odham Ct. App. 
Jan. 27, 2017), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/2017-01-27-
decision-of-appeal-003.pdf [https://perma.cc/66TP-U52Z]. 
96 Id. at 1. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 2. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 3. 
101 Id. at 6–7. 
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O’odham tribal code waived sovereign immunity to injunctive and 
declaratory actions entreating the court to “determine the validity of 
a law, rule, or regulation.”102 Further, the tribal prosecutor followed 
guidelines indicating that banishment orders were subject to judicial 
review.103 
The court also held that due process under the Tohono 
O’odham Constitution requires judicial review of exclusion 
orders.104 Escalante and Lopez alleged that they had suffered from 
their “dislocation from the family home and inability to attend 
ceremonial, governmental, commercial, or social events.”105 
Moreover, Escalante was incarcerated.106 Under such 
circumstances, the Tohono O’odham District Council had “an 
obligation not only to protect its community, but also to ensure the 
fairness of banishment proceedings.”107 
Other tribal courts have played a vital role in balancing those 
obligations. The Squaxin Island Court of Appeals held that those 
facing exclusion may require counsel in a matter concerning the 
exclusion of one of its own trial judges.108 The defendant had no 
criminal record before being charged with delivery of a controlled 
substance.109 She lived on her tribe’s reservation where she worked 
as a tribal historian and a lay judge in fishing disputes.110 Without 
the benefit of counsel, she pled guilty as charged.111 The trial record 
was unclear as to whether she was advised of her rights or 
understood that by pleading guilty she agreed to a lifetime 
exclusion.112 
The court of appeals held for the defendant, concluding that 
she did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty.113 Even though 
the defendant was a lay judge for certain other matters, she did not 
                                                 
102 Id. at 5 (quoting TOHONO O’ODHAM CODE § 2102(A)). 
103 Id. at 5–6. 
104 Id. at 7. 
105 Id. at 8. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 9–10. 
108 Mosier v. Squaxin Island Tribe, 6 N.I.C.S. App. 162 (Squaxin Island Tribal 
Ct. App. 2004), 
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/NICS/html/6NICSApp/6NICSApp162.htm
l [https://perma.cc/B3YE-3LHA]. 
109 Id. at 163. 
110 Id. at 163, 167. 
111 Id. at 163. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 166–67. 
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have sufficient legal training to understand the consequences of her 
plea.114 She had also been denied her due process right to a separate 
exclusion hearing.115 Under such facts, the court held that upholding 
the exclusion would constitute injustice and, as such, allowed the 
defendant to withdraw her guilty plea and remanded the matter to 
the trial court with the benefit of counsel that she may have private 
retained.116 
The Skokomish Tribal Court of Appeals noted the political 
importance of due process in Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Chaplin as 
follows: 
most tribes understand that exercising this 
[exclusion] authority arbitrarily or in violation of 
established procedures creates a climate that 
discourages the investment of time, energy and 
financial resources in the tribe and the reservation by 
the tribe’s business partners, tribal tenants, the non-
member spouses and parents of tribal members.117 
In Chaplin, the appellate court reversed an exclusion order 
because the trial court had failed to comply strictly with the 
governing statute.118 A tribal member had accused her nonmember 
daughter-in-law of assault and theft.119 Without further 
investigation, the tribal council authorized the tribal attorney to file 
a complaint to exclude the nonmember.120 The tribal attorney filed 
the motion.121 The nonmember’s husband appeared in court to 
explain that the mother-in-law was lying and often meddled in their 
marital affairs.122 A hearing on the merits revealed no evidence to 
support the mother-in-law’s allegations.123 Nonetheless, the trial 
court ordered exclusion for the unproven offenses.124 
                                                 
114 Id. at 167. 
115 Id. at 166. 
116 Id. at 167. 
117 Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Chaplin, 7 NICS App. 127, 127 (Skokomish 
Tribal Ct. App. 16, 2006), 
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/NICS/html/7NICSApp/7NICSApp127.htm
l [https://perma.cc/59UL-Q9W8]. 
118 Id. at 131. 
119 Id. at 128. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 128–29. 
123 Id. at 134. 
124 Id. at 129. 
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The court of appeals reversed based on procedural and 
substantive errors.125 Skokomish tribal statute required the party 
seeking civil exclusion, here the mother-in-law, to file a proper 
request for exclusion.126 The mother-in-law had not done so.127 
Thus, the trial court “erred in failing to require strict compliance 
with the procedures governing a complaint for exclusion.”128 The 
court did not explain why it emphasized strict compliance, but such 
a requirement is reasonable given the gravity of exclusion.129 Like 
any analogously serious sentence, an exclusion order must be 
executed under the highest standard of legal compliance. The court 
of appeals recognized it was not a threat to be casually applied.130 
The court also took issue with the fact that the Skokomish 
Tribe may have replaced the original complainant, the mother-in-
law, as petitioner for the exclusion.131 While the Skokomish Tribe’s 
exclusion ordinance allowed the complainant and petitioner to be 
different persons, the court found this to be in conflict with the 
Tribe’s rules of civil procedure.132 In doing so, it cited to the 
Skokomish Tribal Code, which provides that “[j]udges and the 
administrator of the Tribal Court have a duty to tell the Skokomish 
Tribal Council which additional rules are needed to govern common 
procedural questions faced by the court.”133 However, the court 
carefully noted that the mother-in-law not only disappeared from the 
face of the complaint but also had “herself excused from even 
having to appear and give testimony at the court hearing.”134 In so 
stating, the court seemed to emphasize the important right of 
confrontation. 
Other tribal courts of appeals have developed frameworks to 
ensure that those facing exclusion are not haled into a court lacking 
proper jurisdiction. The Chehalis Tribal Court of Appeals has, 
pursuant to this consideration, required that trial courts conduct a 
two-tiered analysis before ordering an exclusion.135 The trial court 
                                                 
125 Id. at 136–37. 
126 Id. at 131. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. 
131 Id. at 132. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 136 (quoting SKOKOMISH CODES AND ORDINANCES § 3.01.012). 
134 Id. at 132. 
135 Foster v. Chehalis Tribe, 4 N.I.C.S. App. 26, 29 (Chehalis Tribal Ct. App. 
Oct. 31, 1995). 
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must conclude first that a defendant committed a charged offense 
and second that exclusion on the basis of that offense is “necessary 
to protect the health, safety, or welfare of the community.”136 The 
Port Gamble S’Klallam code requires the tribal council make this 
same two-tiered finding before ordering an exclusion.137 
Just as tribal appellate courts have reversed trial courts for 
failing to comply with statute, they have also chastised executive 
officers when they attempt to usurp the rule of law. Separation of 
powers is a notoriously controversial issue in Indian country.138 The 
distinct legal heritage of each tribe does not always conform to the 
tripartite model of the United States Constitution with its checks and 
balances. 
In Chehalis Indian Tribe v. Charles, the tribal governing 
body, the business committee, had decided to exclude a nonmember 
who had lived on the reservation for decades.139 While the business 
committee had filed a petition with the court, as was its right, it had 
provided no witnesses and instead asked the trial court to accept 
“automatically” all evidence admitted at its earlier legislative 
hearing.140 The court of appeals rejected this hubristic request and 
concluded that simply “[b]ecause the Business Committee finds that 
[the nonmember] should be excluded does not mean the court will 
also reach that finding without substantial evidence.”141 Rather, the 
business committee had to prove its case like any other litigant.142 
In reaching such a decision, the court affirmed that the tribal 
governing body was subject to due process.143 
Lastly, tribal appellate courts have not hesitated to criticize 
tribal legislation, either in dicta or by striking down offensive laws. 
As an example of dicta, the Chehalis Court of Appeals in Lopez v. 
Chehalis Tribe urged the Chehalis Tribe’s council to legislate for 
                                                 
136 Id. 
137 PORT GAMBLE S'KLALLAM TRIBAL CODE § 22.04.08(b). 
138 See generally, Tribal Executive Branches: A Path to Tribal Constitutional 
Reform, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1662 (2016). 




140 Chehalis Indian Tribe v. Charles, 3 NICS App. 292, 296 (Chehalis Tribal Ct. 
App. 1994). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 296–97. 
143 Id. 
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stronger defendant’s rights while suggesting a statute of limitations 
for exclusion cases.144 
In Burns Paiute Tribe v. Dick, the Burns Paiute Tribe struck 
down a tribal statute as vague and overbroad.145 In that case, the 
Burns Paiute Tribe had excluded several members for certain traffic 
and criminal charges.146 The trial judge had allotted each appellant 
fifteen minutes to gather his things before going, under escort, to 
leave the reservation.147 He did so in accordance with a tribal statute 
providing for the exclusion of those who violate any tribal, federal, 
or state law, or else harm the health, welfare, culture, or spirit of the 
Tribe.148 On appeal, the excluded members argued the exclusion 
ordinance was too vague to “inform those who are subject to it what 
conduct will render them liable to its penalties.”149 
The court agreed, also concluding that the statute was too 
broad; it allowed for the exclusion of a nonmember who committed 
“a parking violation on the reservation or [who] committed an 
infraction in Florida.”150 The Burns Paiute Tribe argued it would 
never enforce it in such a broad fashion.151 The court rejected this 
contention and focused upon the statute rather than its executive 
enforcement.152 As such, the court reversed the order of 
exclusion.153 
The reasoning in Dick, however, came under critical scrutiny 
in Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Jones.154 The Hoopa Court of Appeals, in 
a learned opinion by Judge Matthew Fletcher, explained that the 
court in Dick had identified no actual vagueness in the statute at 
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issue in that case.155 Rather, it had drawn concern to the overbreadth 
of the statute, which could allow for exclusion of those who 
committed traffic violations.156 But “the breadth of the Exclusion 
Ordinance [was] a policy question left to the policymaking branch 
of government” not to the courts.157 The statute at issue in Jones, 
which is identical to that in Dick, might reach minor offenses, but “a 
person of common intelligence could easily discern that 
possibility.”158 
This sampling of tribal appellate opinions demonstrates the 
serious commitment tribal courts have made to protecting due 
process for those facing exclusion. This commitment has served to 
guarantee a defendant’s rights to counsel, confrontation, judicial 
review, and other procedural safeguards, while simultaneously 
requiring that tribal governments make their case in strict 
compliance with tribal law. They have not hesitated to chastise the 
political branches of tribal governments or to strike down 
impermissible legislation. The examples illustrated demonstrate that 
due process is well protected within tribal governments. Other 
examples show an equally important concern for tribal welfare. 
2. Protection of Tribal Welfare 
Tribes have shown an equal unwillingness to allow 
nonmembers to exploit the complexities in tribal jurisdiction to 
escape sanction. The checkerboard of nonmember fee land on 
reservations can often obstruct tribal efforts to exclude the owners 
of property lying within the bounds of a reservation. Thus, the 
Chehalis court in Lopez, cited above,159 also recognized the 
“necessity of preserving the Tribe’s sovereign powers, not the least 
important of which is the Tribe’s power to exclude.”160 Because 
tribes generally lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,161 
exclusion is a necessary tool to allow for the removal of those who 
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161 Compare Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) with 
25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2016). 
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harm the community’s members. Tribes have used it for this 
purpose. Thus, in Schoening v. Chehalis Tribe, the court held that 
the Chehalis Tribe’s jurisdiction over non-Indians extended to the 
exterior borders of the reservation.162 All those residing within the 
reservation were subject to the Chehalis Tribe’s personal and 
territorial jurisdiction. 
The Hoopa Court of Appeals refused to recognize a 
limitation on its jurisdiction over persons on private fee land that 
would endanger public safety in Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Jones.163 In 
that case, an excluded tribal member had appealed his exclusion as 
an unconstitutional taking of his real property within the 
reservation.164 The trial court found that he had conveyed the 
property at issue to his daughter who reconveyed it to him after 
proceedings were already underway.165 On that basis, the court 
concluded that the after-acquired nature of the property precluded a 
takings claim.166 In dicta, however, the court explained that it would 
not have concluded the property unconstitutionally taken even if the 
appellant had held it at the time of trial.167 Exclusion did not cause 
a person to lose his property, it “merely” effected an easement 
precluding the person from occupancy.168 The excluded party 
retained the rights to “develop the property, rent it, sell it, alienate it 
in any other manner, exclude others, etc.”169 A taking, by contrast, 
required the destruction of a parcel’s economic value, which was 
absent in this case.170 To hold otherwise, the court noted, would 
allow any person who has ever been incarcerated to claim their 
sentence effected a taking.171 
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This article now turns to discuss the longstanding 
recognition in United States federal law of the exclusion power held 
generally by all sovereigns and specifically by tribes. 
III. THE TRIBAL EXCLUSION POWER IN  
AMERICAN LAW 
The federal courts have long recognized a tribal power to 
exclude both as an incident of inherent sovereignty and as a 
recognized treaty right. This section traces the history of that dual 
recognition from ancient principles of common law and 
international law to Indian law precedent in American 
jurisprudence. Although Western legal systems have recognized the 
sovereign power to exclude since ancient times, United States courts 
have deliberately and gradually divested that power from tribes to 
facilitate non-Indian settlement in tribal territories. 
A. The Sovereign’s Inherent Exclusion Power 
Western sovereigns have used exclusion as a punishment for 
crimes and political hubris since ancient times.172 During certain 
historical periods, it was the primary form of punishment utilized by 
societies unable or unwilling to employ widespread incarceration. 
For example, between 1650 and 1750, Amsterdam banished 97 
percent of noncapital criminal defendants.173 This practice did not 
cease in the United States. The Constitution of Maryland explicitly 
contemplates the exercise of the exclusion power,174 and courts in at 
least twelve states have either upheld intrastate exclusions or 
recognized that they may be permissible under proper conditions.175 
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Between 1998 and 2001, Houston County, Georgia, banished 142 
individuals.176 Outside such explicit affirmances, scholars have 
identified subtler exclusion practices—for example, sentencing 
courts ordering defendants excluded as a condition of probation, or 
governors making exclusion a condition of pardon.177 
The right to exclude originates in the inherent authority of 
the sovereign to police for the general welfare.178 The Supreme 
Court, drawing upon international law authority Ermin de Vattel, 
explained that the “sovereign may forbid the entrance of his 
territory, either to foreigners in general, or in particular cases, and 
under particular circumstances, or as to particular individuals, and 
for particular purposes.”179 That power carried the right to exclude 
as well as the corollary power to condition admittance.180 As 
Supreme Court Justice William Patterson explained, “it is a power, 
that grows out of the very nature of the social compact” and must 
belong to every government.181 
The sovereign’s recognized right of exclusion features 
prominently in the Marshall trilogy, the foundation of federal Indian 
Law. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Justice Marshall cited Vattel 
in explaining that tribes retained their status as nations with all the 
sovereignty inherent to that status, until qualified by Congressional 
fiat or ruled inconsistent with domestication.182 Thus, American law 
understood tribal sovereignty to carry the inherent authority to 
exclude.183 Similarly, in the earlier case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 
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Justice Marshall pronounced that “no tribunal [could] revise and set 
aside” a tribe’s decision to abolish one’s property rights and exclude 
him from its territory.184 
The Eighth Circuit elaborated upon this power in Buster v. 
Wright as follows: 
to prescribe the terms upon which noncitizens may 
transact business within its borders did not have its 
origin in act of Congress, treaty, or agreement of the 
United States. It was one of the inherent and essential 
attributes of its original sovereignty. It was a natural 
right of that people, indispensable to its autonomy as 
a distinct tribe or nation, and it must remain an 
attribute of its government until by the agreement of 
the nation itself or by the superior power of the 
republic it is taken from it.185 
Late into the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed these holdings in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache.186 There, 
the Court held a tribe could tax the business activities of nonmember 
lessees on their land. In doing so, the Court stated the following: 
Nonmenbers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain 
subject to the tribe’s power to exclude them. This 
power necessarily includes the lesser power to place 
conditions on entry, on continued presence, or on 
reservation conduct…When a tribe grants a non-
Indian the right to be on Indian land, the tribe agrees 
not to exercise its ultimate power to oust the non-
Indian as long as the non-Indian complies with the 
initial conditions of entry. However, it does not 
follow that the lawful property right to be on Indian 
land also immunizes the non-Indian from the tribe’s 
exercise of its lesser-included power to…place other 
conditions on the non-Indian’s conduct or continued 
presence on the reservation. A nonmember who 
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enters the jurisdiction of the tribe remains subject to 
the risk that the tribe will later exercise its sovereign 
power.187 
The Court explicitly grounded this right in tribal sovereignty 
rather than any humbler right incidental to landownership. It 
explained that the sovereign power to exclude was not “merely the 
power possessed by any individual landowner or any social group 
to attach conditions…to the entry by a stranger onto private land or 
into the social group.”188 It recognized that a contrary position 
would “denigrate[] Indian sovereignty.”189 Such a holding derives 
in a clear line from the position espoused by Vattel, grounding the 
power of exclusion in the sovereign’s general power to police for 
the general welfare. 
In more recent years, the Supreme Court has retreated from 
that line. In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court instead 
characterized the right of exclusion as a mere component of 
landownership, such as might be enjoyed by any private party.190 In 
that specific case, the Associated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation had entered into an agreement with the State under 
which the tribe retained no gatekeeping authority over a certain right 
of way.191 On this basis, the Court held it had lost the “landowner’s 
right to occupy and exclude.”192 
But the police power of exclusion is greater than that of a 
landowner. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. State of Illinois, the 
Supreme Court held that the state of Illinois could not convey 
tidelands within the public trust to a railway in a manner that would 
place it outside state jurisdiction.193 It held that a sovereign could 
not “abdicate its police powers in the administration of government 
and the preservation of the peace.”194 While the purposes of 
governance may at times require the sovereign to delegate such 
powers to other bodies, like the state in Strate or private parties, 
“there always remains with the [sovereign] the right to revoke those 
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powers and exercise them in a more direct manner, and one more 
conformable to its wishes.”195 
Viewed in light of such a rule, the consequences of Strate 
become apparent. With Strate, the Court departed from Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. and severed the exclusion power from its roots 
in sovereignty, replanting that stick amongst the frail bundle of the 
landowner’s rights. As discussed below, continued judicial 
endorsement of outdated allotment policies has already plucked 
several of those sticks from the bundle. 
Such a change in the law departs from the executive’s 
longstanding recognition that the tribal exclusion power has been 
affirmed in countless treaties. 
B. The Treaty Right 
This section examines the process by which the United 
States and various Indian nations signed treaties that recognized the 
right to exclude. It focuses on nine treaties that Washington 
Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens signed with tribal nations 
throughout the Pacific Northwest in the mid- to late-1850s.196 These 
treaties share the same Article Two (hereafter Common Article 
Two), by which reservations were established for a tribe’s 
“exclusive use” where no “white man [would] be permitted to reside 
upon [reservation land] without permission of the tribe and the 
superintendent or agent.”197 The Indian canons of construction 
require this language to be analyzed in light of the “history of the 
treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by 
the parties.”198 The history underlying Common Article Two 
provides for this consideration. 
In the early 1850s, United States settlement policy in the 
Pacific Northwest had grown increasingly schizophrenic. While 
assuring tribal nations that it would protect them against 
encroachment absent transfer of land by treaty, it had also passed 
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the Donation Land Act, unleashing eager homesteaders into the 
region.199 Conflict became inevitable. In 1854, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs described the circumstances behind this eventuality 
as follows: 
Indian tribes still claim title to the lands on which the 
whites have located, and which they are now 
cultivating. The jealousy which has resulted from 
this state of things has naturally led to repeated 
hostilities, resulting in severe suffering, and in some 
instances the murder of white settlers, and hindering 
the general growth and prosperity of the civil 
communities of those Territories.200 
Governor Isaac Stevens of the Washington Territory was 
tasked with negotiating treaties to resolve this conflict and free up 
land for white settlement.201 Tribal leaders agreed to negotiate so 
they might protect their resource rights and avoid violence.202 The 
first of the Stevens Treaties failed to achieve this result.203 Within a 
year of signing the Treaty of Medicine Creek, the Nisqually led their 
tribal allies to war against the settlers of Puget Sound in order to 
preserve their most valuable farmlands that were not included within 
the treaty reservation.204 This conflict, known as the Puget Sound 
War, remained in the minds of later treaty negotiators and informed 
the Snoqualmie negotiators of the treaty of Point Elliot to remark, 
“[i]f you whites pay the Indians that fight you, it must be good to 
fight.”205 
Other negotiators simply wanted the settlers to leave so that 
they might regain some peaceful prosperity. Thus, tribal parties to 
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the Treaty of Point No Point asked Stevens to “order[ the settlers] to 
go away.”206 A Skokomish member explained that his fellow 
Skokomish wanted to plant potatoes in their territory but feared that 
settlers would steal them unless Congress ratified their tribal 
boundaries and recognized their power to exclude settlers.207 The 
tribal negotiators wanted those settlers gone regardless of their 
status as residents, transients, or exploiters of tribal territories.208 
They negotiated a multi-faceted treaty framework that echoed the 
understanding embedded in the common law that sovereigns 
enjoyed the police power to exclude persons from their territory.209  
In light of this history and the understandings of the Indian 
signatories, the Ninth Circuit, in analyzing the treaty with the 
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs, has correctly explained 
that Common Article Two was “designed to provide [the Tribe] land 
where they would be able to separate themselves from non-Native 
Americans” and must be construed to effectuate this purpose.210 The 
author will return below to the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of Common 
Article Two in considering whether federal courts should allow the 
exclusion of federal officers enforcing generally applicable federal 
law. 
Regardless of this historical backdrop, the strong right of 
exclusion affirmed in common law and treaty was soon eroded by 
the greed of the allotment era Congress. 
C. Allotment and the Judicial Impairment  
of the Exclusion Power 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, as the fires of 
the Indian Wars cooled, a boundless hunger for tribal lands 
rekindled in the East. In quenching that hunger, the United States 
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would break its recent promises to protect the right of tribes to 
exclude settlers. Two examples are instructive. 
The appropriation of the Black Hills in the territory of the 
Sioux Nation is emblematic of these pressures and their result. The 
United States had earlier agreed to protect the rights of the Lakota 
to the Black Hills from settler depredations.211 This changed when 
gold was discovered in the Black Hills in 1875 and settler 
immigration intensified.212 Rather than meet this settler violence 
with force of arms, the United States concluded, in the words of the 
Secretary of the Interior, that it had become “impossible to keep the 
white people out.” 213 Instead of protecting tribal interests, the guns 
were turned against the Lakota in the Black Hills War, and their 
exclusive monopoly upon their sacred sites was shattered.214 
In another example, the United States reneged on earlier 
treaty promises to the Nez Perce by shrinking their reservation. The 
Nez Perce Tribe signed a treaty with the United States in 1855 
guaranteeing its exclusive use and occupancy of an extensive 
reservation.215 In 1861 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs informed 
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs that an “invasion” of gold 
mining settlers had begun to increasingly threaten these treaty 
rights.216 Senator James Nesmith of Oregon observed that while the 
Nez Perce had “faithfully observed the obligations of the treaty,” the 
United States had violated it by “permitting [American] citizens to 
invade their reservation in search of gold.”217 The next year, the 
Indian agent on the Nez Perce reservation issued an injunction 
against the entry and residence of settlers.218 The Commissioner 
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reported to the Secretary of the Interior that the Nez Perce Indian 
Reservation would “in a short time be so overrun and occupied by 
whites, as to render it practically useless for Indian purposes.”219 
The United States ultimately responded to settler violence by 
negotiating a subsequent treaty that reduced the Nez Perce 
reservation by ninety percent.220 It determined that this was the “best 
way to preserve peace.”221 Again, the United States broke its 
promise to maintain the rights of tribes in the exclusive use and 
possession of their reservations. 
The pressure of settlement, fanned by executive 
acquiescence, soon translated into congressional policy. “Driven by 
a greed for the land holdings of the tribes,” Congress passed the 
General Allotment Act also known as the Dawes Act after its 
sponsor, Massachusetts Senator Henry Dawes.222 The Dawes Act 
authorized the President to survey those reservations he deemed 
suitable for agriculture and to divide them into allotments for 
individual Indians.223 Accordingly, President Theodore Roosevelt 
characterized the Act as “a mighty pulverizing engine to break up 
the tribal mass [in that [i]t acts directly upon the family and the 
individual.”224 Once persons on the selected reservations had 
received the allotments, the surplus was opened to settlement.225 
Additionally, the allotments were not safe from further 
alienation. By the original Act’s terms, the United States would hold 
the allotments in trust for twenty-five years, after which the persons 
would take them in freely alienable fee.226 But Congress quickly 
bowed to the entreatments of settlers and amended the original Act 
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to allow the Secretary of the Interior to cut short this trust period and 
confer fee title on any Indian deemed “competent and capable of 
managing her affairs.”227 
Without these restrictions on alienation, the land quickly 
transferred from Indian hands to those of settlers and federal 
institutions like the military and National Park Service. Many tribal 
allottees struggled to succeed agriculturally, for their efforts were 
often hampered by the general economic downturn of the time.228 
Because the allotments had become subject to state taxation, many 
were ultimately seized for nonpayment of those taxes.229 
Speculators purchased up these lands in “voluntary or fraudulent 
sales…[or] at sheriffs’ sales for nonpayment of taxes or other 
liens.”230 The climate of allotment encouraged other settlers to 
simply squat on reservation land without attempting to buy it, 
confident that their crimes would face little repercussion.231 
Between the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887 and its repeal 
pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, tribes lost an 
estimated two-thirds of their land base.232 
With the loss of their land, tribes lost the power guaranteed 
by treaty to control settler violence on their reservations. In this 
period, tribes continued to exercise jurisdiction over land remaining 
in Indian hands, regardless of the changed character of the 
surrounding area.233 Thus, in 1908, the Rosebud Sioux Police, 
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enforcing federal regulations, arrested a tribal member on his 
allotment in the otherwise open area of the reservation for hosting 
an illegal dance.234 After the Tribe released the arrested member, the 
member notified the state police of his detention; the police then 
arrested the tribal officers.235 With their authority so compromised, 
tribes and their members struggled to maintain the safety of their 
communities.236 As Indian Superintendent Thomas King reported in 
regards non-Indian exploitation of tribal members on the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Reservation, “[T]he feeling [among settlers] is that the 
Indian is fair game for anyone who can hit the mark.”237 
Around the same time, both the Supreme Court and Eighth 
Circuit recognized that allotment did not prevent tribes from 
imposing certain business regulations on those doing business 
within their territories. In Morris v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court 
powerfully declared that allotment and the consequent opening of 
many reservations did not: 
deprive these Indians of the power to enact laws with 
regard to licenses or taxes, nor exempt purchasers of 
town or city lots from the operation of such 
legislation. Purchasers of lots do so with notice of 
existing Indian treaties…Such lands are sold under 
the assumption that the purchasers will comply with 
the local laws.238 
Similarly, in Buster, discussed above,239 the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that: 
[the Creek Nation’s] jurisdiction to govern the 
inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or limited 
by the title to the land which they occupy in it…The 
theory that the…conveyance of the title to lots or 
lands within it to private individuals exempts 
the…owners or occupants of such lots from the 
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exercise of all its governmental powers…is too 
unique and anomalous to invoke assent.240  
The Solicitor of the Interior agreed, recognizing in 1934 that tribes 
retained the power to exclude as a landowner, as well as a local 
government, for this power derives from “dominion as well as 
sovereignty.”241 
However, Superintendent King’s words concerning the 
increasing vulnerability of tribes and their members would prove 
prescient. Since allotment, tribes have struggled to exercise their 
power to exclude nonmembers from checkerboarded reservations. 
In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
allotment period to have deprived tribes not only of land but of their 
sovereign jurisdiction.242 The relevant treaty in that case, the 1868 
Fort Laramie Treaty, provided in its second article that a reservation 
would be “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation” of the Indians therein named.243 The Court recognized 
that this right arguably preserved the Crow Tribe’s jurisdiction over 
hunting and fishing in areas of the tribe’s exclusive use and 
occupation.244 
In concluding that the Crow Tribe lacked jurisdiction to 
regulate non-Indian fishing on nonmember fee land within the 
bounds of its reservation, the Court explained that the Allotment Era 
Congress did not intend “that the non-Indians who would settle upon 
alienated allotted lands would be subject to tribal regulatory 
authority. Indeed, throughout the congressional debates, allotment 
of Indian land was consistently equated with the dissolution of tribal 
affairs.”245 
The Supreme Court has explained that treaty language 
recognizing the right to exclude “with respect to reservation lands 
must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those lands.”246 
It has questioned whether “Congress would intend that non-Indians 
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purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction 
when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate 
destruction of tribal government.”247 Most poignantly, the Court has 
held that Congress’s purpose of so-called “peaceful assimilation” 
could not “be advanced if feeholders could be excluded from fishing 
or hunting on their acquired property.”248 By making these 
statements, the Court argued that the alienation of tribal lands had 
shattered the exclusivity of their use and occupation by tribes. In 
doing so, the Court prioritized the intent of the Allotment Congress 
and the expectations of that era’s rapacious settlers over the treaty 
rights of tribes and the intent of today’s Congress.249 
To reach this result, the Court had to narrow Morris and 
Buster to their facts, holding them to stand for the proposition that 
tribes may regulate the conduct of those who enter consensual 
relationships with those tribes or their members.250 But the Buster 
court had pronounced broadly that “[t]he theory that the consent of 
a government…to the conveyance of the title to lots or lands within 
it to private individuals exempts the…owners or occupants of such 
lots from the exercise of all its governmental powers…is too unique 
and anomalous to invoke assent.”251 Such an understanding had 
prevailed when the United States negotiated provisions like 
Common Article Two with tribes. Unless Montana is read to 
impliedly give assent to such an anomalous theory, then Montana 
must stand, in this respect, for the proposition that residence within 
the boundaries of a tribal reservation exhibits a sufficient consensual 
relationship to support tribal civil jurisdiction. 
While Congress has since disavowed the policy of allotment, 
the Supreme Court has refused to abandon it and continues to 
perpetuate the allotment agenda. While the Indian Reorganization 
Act repudiated the allotment policies of previous legislation, it “did 
not restore to the Indians the exclusive use of those lands that had 
already passed to non-Indians.”252 Inasmuch as tribes no longer 
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possess exclusive use over much of their reservations, they lack the 
power to exclude absent the two exceptions announced in Montana. 
The power to exclude has been used to affirm tribal zoning 
authority in reservation areas of predominately tribal ownership. In 
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian 
Nation, the Yakima Nation argued that it maintained the right to 
regulate the use of nonmember fee land within its reservation as an 
incident of its treaty power of exclusion.253 The relevant treaty with 
the Yakimas indicated that the land reserved by the Yakima Nation 
“shall be set apart…for the [Yakimas’] exclusive use and 
benefit…[and no] white man, excepting those in the employment of 
the Indian Department, [shall] be permitted to reside upon the said 
reservation without permission of the tribe.”254 However, the Court 
held that the power to exclude only extended as far as the Yakima 
Nation’s “exclusive use and benefit” of the land.255 As such, a 
majority of the Court recognized only the power to zone where it 
was necessary to protect the welfare of the tribe, in accordance with 
the relevant Montana exception.256 
However, a minority, announcing the judgment as to a 
consolidated case and concurring in the overall judgment, explained 
why the introduction of non-Indian landownership should not limit 
exclusionary jurisdiction. The appellants in Brendale were 
landowners on the Yakima reservation.257 One lived in an open area, 
defined by non-Indian ownership over the majority of land.258 The 
other lived in a closed area defined by majority tribal ownership.259 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O’Connor, concluded that the 
Yakima Nation could exercise zoning authority over the closed 
area.260 The Supreme Court reasoned that non-Indian ownership 
over a “very small proportion” of the area, did not “deprive the tribe 
of the right to ensure that this area maintains its unadulterated 
character.”261 The Supreme Court recognized the impact a contrary 
holding would have on that character in the following passage: 
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The incremental shifts in the texture and quality of 
the surrounding environment occasioned by discrete 
land-use decisions within an expansive territory are 
not readily monitored or regulated by considering 
whether the uses that were actually authorized on 
[the relevant] property imperiled the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or 
welfare of the Tribe.262 
Stevens’ opinion provides a powerful reflection on the 
impact of recent directions in relevant law. Tribal sovereignty and 
self-government depend on the right to control entry to the 
sovereign’s territory. By reducing the tribal exclusion power to an 
incident of landownership, courts have ensured that allotment can 
continue to wreck its terrible magic, carving away at tribal well-
being. 
In summary, the courts have retreated from the bold 
recognition of early precedent and the terms of treaties. Earlier 
courts, including the Supreme Court, recognized that the right to 
exclude was an incident of sovereign police authority. As such, the 
sovereign could exercise it within the borders of its domain, 
regardless of who owned the land on which a to-be-regulated 
activity occurred. But conceding to the policies of allotment, the 
Supreme Court has retreated and allowed a policy directed at 
divesting tribes of their landholdings to inappropriately divest them 
of their police power. Brendale, a split opinion recognizing the tribal 
power to zone and exclude when a tribe controls the majority and 
the character of a relevant area, presents a narrow exception to this 
rule, but by and large, courts guided by opinions like Montana and 
Strate have reduced tribes to landowners. 
As discussed below, the judiciary has departed from the 
trajectory of the other political branches as the latter become more 
willing to reaffirm the relationship of the exclusion power to 
sovereignty. 
IV. SUPPORT FROM THE POLITICAL BRANCHES 
In signing treaties with Indian nations, the United States 
assumed an obligation to protect tribes in the exclusive use of their 
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reservations.263 As discussed above,264 this protection was a guiding 
motivation for the relevant tribal signatories. This section discusses 
how the political branches of the federal government, the executive 
and the legislative, can each assist in upholding that trust. 
Pursuant to its treaty promises, the United States should 
assist in the enforcement of exclusion orders. The same 
administration that enacted the Indian Reorganization Act 
recognized an inherent tribal authority to exclude nonmembers since 
at least 1934, when Interior Solicitor Nathan Margold and his 
assistant Felix Cohen published an opinion entitled “Powers of 
Indian Tribes.”265 According to Solicitor Margold, those powers 
included the power 
[t]o remove or to exclude from the limits of the 
reservation nonmembers of the tribe, excepting 
authorized Government officials and persons now 
occupying reservation lands under lawful authority, 
and to prescribe appropriate rules and regulations 
governing such removal and exclusion, and 
governing the conditions under which nonmembers 
of the tribe may come upon tribal land.266 
The Department of Justice has put the Interior’s recognition 
of a tribal power to exclude into practice by enforcing federal 
trespass laws.267 The United States Attorneys for the Districts of 
New Mexico and South Dakota have provided powerful and recent 
examples of this action.268 In New Mexico, the Nambe Pueblo 
                                                 
263 See, e.g., Treaty with the Nisqualli, Puyallup, Etc., 10 Stat. 1132 (1854); 
Treaty with the Quinaielt, Etc., 12 Stat. 971 (1855); Treaty with the Dwamish, 
Suquamish, Etc., 12 Stat. 927 (1855). 
264 See supra Section III.B. 
265 Chapman, supra note 241. 
266 Chapman, supra note 241, at 446. 
267 The Coquille Tribal Code authorizes intergovernmental cooperation in the 
enforcement of not only exclusion but trespass violations. COQUILLE INDIAN 
TRIBAL CODE § 652.800. 
268 Other states have been less supportive. For example, in 1999, the Alaska 
Native Village of Perryville passed a resolution banishing John Tague, a tribal 
member who had repeatedly committed threatening and assaultive acts. See 
Ryan Fortson, Advancing Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction in Alaska, 32 
ALASKA L. REV. 93, 148 (2015). Perryville followed this resolution by 
successfully filing for a permanent injunction against Tague in State court. Id. 
Tague violated this injunction, returning to Perryville. Id. Perryville then filed 
for and obtained a writ of assistance requiring the Alaska State Troopers remove 
Tague from the village. Id. Alaska responded by writing the court to challenge 
237 
passed a resolution in February 2014 excluding a non-Indian named 
Steve Romero from its boundaries indefinitely.269 Romero was a 
repeat drug and domestic violence offender.270 The Pueblo therefore 
deemed him a threat to the community and the maintenance of peace 
therein.271 As such, they excluded him.272 But Romero violated that 
order and returned to the reservation to harass tribal members.273 
The U.S. Marshal’s Service removed him.274 
The United States Attorney then entered and charged 
Romero with criminal trespass for violating the Nambe Pueblo’s 
exclusion order under the Indian Country Crimes Act and New 
Mexico law.275 He may face up to a year in prison.276 
The United States Attorney for the District of South Dakota 
brought similar charges in United States v. Nichols.277 Steve 
                                                 
the validity of the tribe’s banishment order and writ of assistance. Id. It argued 
that Perryville could not exercise such sovereignty because it lacked Indian 
country status. Id. The court ultimately upheld its earlier order, concluding that 
Alaska lacked standing to seek vacatur of the injunction. Id. at 149. It also 
upheld the injunction but narrowly because Tague was a tribal member. Id. 
269 T. S. Last, More Tribes Bring Back Sentence of Banishment, ALBUQUERQUE 







275 Complaint, United States v. Romero, No. 16-MJ-2671 at 1 (D.N.M. 2016), 
http://www.indianz.com/News/2016/06/24/12117946183.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M4S7-DPYJ]. It may also be noted that Alaska State Troopers 
have informally enforced tribal exclusion orders as trespass violations, even 
absent tribal territorial jurisdiction. See Lisa Demer, Young Man Blamed for 3 
Arson Deaths in Alaska Village gets Traditional Justice: Banishment, ALASKA 
DISPATCH NEWS (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/rural-
alaska/2016/09/11/young-man-blamed-for-three-arson-deaths-gets-traditional-
justice-banishment/ [https://perma.cc/LSS7-ZKCK]. At a conference in October 
2017, Alaska Attorney General Jahna Lindemuth acknowledged that tribal 
exclusion orders were independent sovereign actions over which her State 
generally had no authority. See Rachel D’Oro, Alaska AG Outlines State 
Position on Tribal Banishment, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct 18, 2017), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/alaska/articles/2017-10-17/alaska-ag-
outlines-state-position-on-tribal-banishment. Alaska, Lindemuth further stated, 
would only become involved to enforce tribal exclusion orders when asked or to 
address citizen complaints of tribal overreaching; she further expressed 
sympathy for tribes seeking to protect the public safety in the absence of law 
enforcement. Id. 
276 Last, supra note 269. 
277 United States v. Nichols, No. CR 14-30038-MAM, 2014 WL 4185360, at *1 
(D.S.D. Aug. 20, 2014); see also Press Release, United States Department of 
Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of South Dakota, Man Charged with 
238 
Nichols, a non-Indian resident of Chicago, had been convicted 
several times in federal court for violent assaults committed within 
the Rosebud reservation.278 The tribal court and council ordered his 
exclusion, which he subsequently violated several times.279 On 
March 14, 2014, he was arrested by the tribal police for driving on 
a public Bureau of Indian Affairs road within the boundaries of the 
reservation.280 Because he was not Indian, the tribal police contacted 
the FBI.281 The United States Attorney charged him with violating 
South Dakota’s Criminal Trespass statute as incorporated by the 
Assimilative Crimes Act and the Indian Country Crimes Act.282 The 
court’s disposition of the matter is discussed more fully below. 
The National Congress of American Indians supports these 
federal prosecutions. In 2015, it passed a resolution urging federal 
law enforcement and United States Attorney’s Offices to “fully 
enforce tribal exclusion orders, protection orders and trespass laws 
against those who cause serious threats to persons and damage to 
property in Indian [c]ountry.”283 It also called upon Congress to 
“consult with Indian tribes and develop legislation to increase 
federal penalties and deterrence for Native and Non-Natives who 
violate tribal exclusion orders…and repeat offenders of Indian 
country hunting, fishing, and trespass laws.”284 
In order to recognize tribal sovereignty, foster a spirit of 
collaboration, and earn the trust of tribes, the United States federal 
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government should develop an official policy deferring to tribes 
regarding their exclusion practices. For example, the Department of 
Justice or local United States Attorney’s Offices should issue 
regulations requiring line prosecutors to either charge exclusion 
violations referred by tribes under state trespass statutes or provide 
tribes with justification for their declining to do so. Doing so will 
further what one scholar has recently characterized as the “duty of 
protection” the federal government has assumed to protect the safety 
of tribal communities that have been partially divested of sovereign 
power.285 
Congress may also further tribal efforts by affirming broader 
tribal jurisdiction to better facilitate the exclusion of offenders. It 
took a substantial step by reauthorizing the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA) in 2013. Amongst its provisions, that Act 
amended 18 U.S.C. § 2265 to recognize full tribal jurisdiction “to 
issue and enforce protection orders involving any person, including 
the authority to enforce any orders through civil contempt 
proceedings [and] to exclude violators from Indian land.”286 While 
this power has allowed tribal governments to make substantial 
progress in confronting non-Indian domestic abusers, critics have 
pointed to a range of offenses it does not cover. These offenses 
include crimes committed by offenders without sufficient tribal ties, 
crimes between strangers, and crimes against children.287 
Congress recently considered expanding the jurisdiction 
reaffirmed under VAWA. Senate Bill 2785, introduced without 
passage in the 114th Congress, would have expand VAWA’s grant 
of special criminal jurisdiction to cover drug-related crimes, crimes 
against children, and crimes against tribal law enforcement.288 
Federal prosecutors and Congress should continue to 
maintain this support in bolstering the tribal power of exclusion. As 
one scholar notes, support from the political branches for the 
expansion of tribal self-government in law and order should 
encourage federal courts to exercise great caution when considering 
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challenges to the tribal exclusion power.289 Those courts, on their 
own, can take immediate steps to broadly interpret tribal jurisdiction 
in the exercise of the exclusion power. 
V. A NEW FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE  
OF EXCLUSION 
For better or worse, challenges to tribal exclusion orders will 
often reach the federal courts. Challenges to these orders raise many 
unresolved issues. This article highlights three areas of concern. 
First, it addresses the jurisdictional question by explaining that tribes 
retain sufficient jurisdiction to order exclusions on either an 
independent and inherent sovereign basis or on the proper 
application of the Montana exceptions. Second, it looks to 
circumstances where federal public accommodations laws may 
seem to impair tribal exclusionary power. Third, it responds to 
recent litigation on the use of habeas corpus as a remedy to 
exclusion. 
A. Tribal Exclusion Jurisdiction 
There is little question that the Montana presumption placed 
severe limitations on tribal jurisdiction over civil matters, including 
those concerning exclusion.290 But this article considers two bases 
on which courts may rely in their efforts to support the right to 
exclude. First, courts can recognize that the tribal power of 
exclusion rests on a separate and independent basis of sovereignty, 
which is distinguished from the general civil jurisdiction covered 
under Montana. Second, courts can support the tribal exclusion 
power under the two-prong Montana test itself. 
1. The Independent Basis Theory 
The independent basis theory to support the right of 
exclusion draws on longstanding Supreme Court precedent and 
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traces back to the work of the jurist Vattel.291 As the Court in the 
Merrion opinion recognized, tribes maintain a power of exclusion 
that is independent of their status as landowner.292 Rather, it 
proceeds from the sovereign’s power to control entry onto its 
territory.293 
The District Court for the District of South Dakota rested on 
similar grounds in upholding charges against Nichols.294 After 
Nichols was charged, he moved to dismiss the trespass charges, 
collaterally attacking the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s original exclusion 
as ordered without personal jurisdiction.295 
In considering the extent of a tribe’s civil regulatory 
jurisdiction, the court recognized that “as a general matter,” under 
Montana, “tribes do not possess authority over non-Indians who 
come within their borders.”296 Thus, outside the Montana 
exceptions, they cannot “regulate the use of [nonmember fee] 
land.”297 But “[a]s part of their residual sovereignty, tribes retain the 
inherent power to exclude outsiders from tribal territory.”298 This 
power “exists independently of their general jurisdictional authority. 
Even when they lack civil or criminal jurisdiction over a 
nonmember, their officers nonetheless may eject individuals who 
have violated tribal law or stop, detain and deliver them to the proper 
authorities.”299 As such, the court pointed back to the Merrion 
opinion’s recognition of the exclusion power’s separate basis in 
tribal sovereignty.300 By doing so, the court suggested that the 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe had an independent basis for jurisdiction over 
Nichols even though he was arrested for traveling on a non-tribal 
road; this is the same situation found in Strate. But unlike in Strate, 
the Rosebud Sioux Tribe was not trying to adjudicate conduct on 
land that they did not own. Rather, it attempted to exclude Nichols 
from the reservation as a step collateral to any particular conduct 
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triggering the exclusion.301 Put otherwise, Strate pertained to tribal 
jurisdiction over conduct; Nichols pertained to jurisdiction over the 
entry of persons. 
Ultimately the court decided the matter on Nichol’s failure 
to exhaust his challenge to tribal jurisdiction in tribal court.302 It also 
noted that the Montana exceptions might well have supported 
general tribal civil jurisdiction.303 But the strongest jurisdictional 
basis was the separate and independent basis for the exclusionary 
power.304 As such, it provides a model to preserve Merrion’s broad 
recognition of tribal authority into the future. 
Still, careful application of Montana holds its own promise. 
2. Preserving the Exclusionary Power  
Under Montana 
As discussed above, Montana introduced a presumption 
against general tribal civil jurisdiction over the conduct of 
nonmembers on fee land. Thus, in considering how courts can 
broadly recognize tribal exclusionary authority, it must be noted that 
the Montana exceptions do not limit tribal control over exclusion 
from tribal lands. The Tenth Circuit’s holding in Norton v. Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation supports this 
conclusion.305 
In that case, Utah state police had pursued Todd Murray, a 
Ute tribal member, onto his reservation and shot him to death.306 
Murray’s family and tribe sued the involved officers in tribal court 
for wrongful death, trespass, and other torts.307 The officers sued in 
federal court seeking an injunction.308 The federal court granted this 
relief, holding that the Supreme Court had foreclosed tribal civil 
jurisdiction over state police officers, thus making tribal exhaustion 
unnecessary.309 
The Tenth Circuit reversed that order. It concluded that the 
officers had failed to exhaust their tribal remedies, a necessary 
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prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction because the trespass claim 
“at least arguably implicate[d] the tribe’s core sovereign rights to 
exclude and to self-govern.”310 It characterized the power to exercise 
these rights as “traditional and undisputed.”311 Further, it held that 
adjudication of a trespass claim concerned not the tribal court’s 
adjudicatory authority but its regulatory power to control entry.312 
Although the Tenth Circuit held Montana to govern, it did so to 
“‘readily agree[]’ that the tribe had jurisdiction to bar nonmembers 
from tribal land and recognized that the tribe may place conditions 
on nonmembers’ entry onto tribal land over and above the authority 
that tribes have to regulate nonmember conduct on reservation land 
in general.”313 
Returning to Montana’s effect on fee land, the Supreme 
Court recognized two exceptions to the presumption against tribal 
jurisdiction. The first arises when the offender has entered into a 
consensual relationship with the tribe or its members, and the second 
arises when the relevant conduct threatens “the political integrity, 
the economic security, or the health or welfare of [a] tribe.”314 As 
discussed above, many tribes have incorporated these exceptions 
into their exclusion codes.315 Further, most circumstances of 
exclusion will fit within one or both of these exceptions. 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Hardin v. White Mountain 
Apache Tribe is illustrative of this fact.316 In Hardin, the tribal 
defendant had excluded Hardin for concealing stolen federal 
property.317 In upholding the exclusion, the court recognized the 
diminution of tribal criminal jurisdiction affected by Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe,318 a case in which the Supreme Court had 
concluded that tribes generally lack criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.319 However, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Oliphant had 
not limited a tribe’s civil power to exclude those it could not 
prosecute.320 The court also recognized that Montana does not limit 
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this authority when a tribe exercises it to “keep reservation peace 
and protect the health and safety of tribal members.”321 
Thus, the court held that the “intent of the tribal [exclusion] 
ordinance is merely to remove a person who ‘threatens or has some 
direct effect on the…health or welfare of the tribe,’ a permissible 
civil regulation of the Tribe’s internal order.”322 Similarly, by 
choosing to enter and reside on the reservation, Hardin had entered 
a sufficient consensual relationship to justify subjecting him to 
exclusion.323 Although Hardin is distinguishable from Strate, 
because Hardin lived pursuant to a lease with the tribe that expressly 
reserved the tribe’s power to exclude, the exclusion at issue 
extended beyond the leased trust land under his home, for it 
encompassed the entire reservation.324 
Hardin provides important lessons to courts upholding the 
tribal exclusionary power. First, in applying the first Montana 
exception, the Ninth Circuit accorded comity and deferred to the 
tribe’s assertion that it was acting to protect tribal welfare. As 
discussed earlier, tribes must confront many social ills in their 
communities, including drug commerce, violence, and colonial 
exploitation, which were all introduced by non-Indians.325 Tribal 
governments are in the best positions to assess these ills and craft 
appropriate solutions. Courts should not second-guess the intent 
behind these solutions. 
The expertise that tribal courts and legislatures utilize in 
interpreting and applying the first Montana exception highlights the 
importance of the tribal exhaustion requirement. The Supreme Court 
has held that parties challenging tribal regulatory or adjudicative 
jurisdiction generally must do so first in tribal court.326 Moreover, 
they must maintain that challenge through the entire process 
afforded by tribal law, including administrative, trial, and appellate 
review.327 This provides federal courts reviewing tribal actions “the 
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benefit of [tribal] expertise in such matters” “by allowing a full 
record to be developed in the Tribal Court.”328 That expertise may 
pertain to both the “factual and legal bases for the challenge to 
[tribal] jurisdiction.”329 To excuse exhaustion and thus provide 
“unconditional access to the federal forum would place it in direct 
competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter’s 
authority over reservation affairs.”330 The factual concerns 
underlying exclusionary jurisdiction are complex and are often 
unique to the tribal context. Strict adherence to the exhaustion 
doctrine and comity between federal and tribal courts are therefore 
necessary. 
Regarding the second Montana exception, courts should 
follow Hardin and recognize that nonmembers enter a consensual 
relationship with a tribe by virtue of their entry onto reservation 
land.331 This follows Vattel’s longstanding principle that the 
exclusion power is a corollary of the right to control entry. Montana 
limits tribal regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction over conduct by 
nonmembers on their own fee land. Once on that land, nonmembers 
can act without otherwise entering a consensual relationship with 
the tribe whose reservation surrounds it. But they enter such a 
relationship at the time they come on to the reservation. 
Even this broad interpretation of the first Montana exception 
does not apply, most offensive conduct will imply or involve a 
sufficient consensual relationship. The transactions involved in the 
drug trade provide an obvious commercial example, but the same 
can be said for instances of violence perpetrated by non-Indians. 
The recent case of Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band 
of Choctaw Indians provides a helpful example.332 Here, Dollar 
General contracted with a youth job training program operated by 
the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians.333 A Dollar General 
manager allegedly molested a tribally enrolled youth participating 
in the youth training program, who had been assigned to work at 
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Dollar General.334 The case concerned the jurisdiction of the 
Mississippi Choctaw Tribal Court over tort claims based upon the 
alleged molestation.335 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
company had entered a sufficient consensual relationship with the 
tribe and its members by contracting with a tribal job training 
program and taking on the victimized youth in an internship 
capacity.336 If the posture of the case were transformed into an action 
for exclusion against the manager, a sufficient consensual 
relationship would also be found. The abusive manager consents to 
enter a relationship with his victim by commission of his offense.337 
Montana does not require the consensual relationship to preexist the 
offensive conduct. 
Similarly, there is no just reason to say that the person who 
abuses his spouse has entered a sufficient relationship but the person 
who chooses to abuse a stranger has not. Both offending persons can 
foresee the territorial sovereign exercising its jurisdiction over such 
conduct or over such persons to conclude that they are not wanted 
on the reservation. 
Thus, courts can support tribal exclusion power under the 
Montana exceptions by exercising a spirit of comity and deferring 
to tribal interpretations of the tribal welfare exception, as well as by 
interpreting the consensual relationship exception broadly. Even so, 
special issues arise when tribes seek to exclude those persons 
protected by federal law. 
B. Exclusion and Generally Applicable Federal Law 
Tribal exclusion actions may, at times, conflict with federal 
statutes guaranteeing access to certain persons. As an example, the 
Makah Tribal Code allows for the exclusion of persons with 
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contagious diseases.338 This provision may allow exclusions that 
would seem to violate Title III of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), which guarantees disabled persons equal access to 
places of public accommodation.339 When the exercise of tribal 
rights interferes with public accommodation protections, the results 
are “difficult case[s], in which significant values are in conflict that 
cannot be fully reconciled. Both the Indian tribes and people with 
disabilities share strong interests in maintaining independence and 
self-sufficiency, and both groups face substantial obstacles in 
protecting those interests, historically and currently.”340 
This article considers the possibility that an exclusion action 
may conflict with a federal statute to provide some thought on when 
the tribal exclusion power might trump generally applicable federal 
accommodations law. It concludes that such instances might arise 
when tribes retain a treaty-protected right of exclusion or when the 
tribe has taken steps to regulate and protect against discriminatory 
barriers to access. 
The Eleventh Circuit considered whether Title III provided 
a private right of action against Indian tribes in Florida Paraplegic, 
Ass’n.. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians.341 Here, two associations for 
the advancement of disabled people’s rights sued for injunctive 
relief against the defendant tribe (d/b/a its casino) to remedy failures 
to meet ADA requirements for the accessibility of public 
accommodations.342 The court considered, first, whether ADA Title 
III applies to Indian tribes, and, second, whether the Act abrogates 
tribal sovereign immunity.343 
The Eleventh Circuit applied a Ninth Circuit test to 
determine whether Title III provided a right to plaintiffs. Pursuant 
to Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, a general federal statute 
presumptively applies to Indian tribes unless its application would 
(1) abrogate treaty rights, (2) interfere with purely intramural 
matters touching exclusive rights of self-government, or (3) 
contradict Congress’s intent.344 Because the third exception focuses 
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on the specific text and intent of the relevant federal statute, 
consideration of whether application of ADA Title III contradicts 
congressional intent would not bear upon application of other 
statutes. Thus, this article focuses on the first two exceptions. 
1. Impairment of the Treaty Right to Exclude 
A court will not presume a general federal statute to apply to 
Indian tribes if that application would impair a treaty right. Under 
this rule, analysis of a relevant federal statute consists of two parts. 
First, the court must identify and interpret the relevant right in the 
treaty.345 Second, it must consider whether the right is sufficiently 
specific to bar application of the statute.346 The scope of the right 
will depend on how the statute will be applied; in some 
circumstances, the right will be too general to bar application, but in 
others it will be sufficiently specific. 
The first step looks to the treaty history of the specific tribe 
involved in a given case. Once the appropriate treaty is identified, it 
is interpreted in accordance with the Indian canon of statutory 
construction. The canon requires that “[a]mbiguities in tribal treaties 
[be] construed liberally to favor Native Americans and to respect 
traditional notions of Native American sovereignty.”347 Further, 
“treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as they would have 
understood them.”348 Intent may be evidenced by “the history of the 
treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by 
the parties.”349 
As discussed above,350 Common Article Two of the Stevens 
Treaties provided reservations to be established for the tribes’ 
“exclusive use” where no “white man [would] be permitted to reside 
upon [reservation land] without permission of the tribe and the 
superintendent or agent.”351 The tribal negotiators wanted those 
settlers gone regardless of their status as residents, transients, or 
usufructory exploiters of tribal territories.352 Interpretation in the 
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light of such facts suggests that the right reserved under Common 
Article Two not only covered the exclusion of non-Indians from 
residence on the reservation but “set[] forth a general right of 
exclusion.”353 
Once the tribe and court identify the relevant treaty right, the 
tribe must show that the general right, as applied to the proposed 
statutory application, would present what the Sixth Circuit in 
Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB called a specific and 
“direct conflict [with] the entry necessary for effectuating the 
statutory scheme.”354 In United States Department of Labor v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission (US DOL), the 
Ninth Circuit considered whether treaty language similar to 
Common Article Two presented such a conflict. In US DOL, the 
tribe sought to exclude federal inspectors acting pursuant the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).355 Recognizing that 
the treaty provided for a general right of exclusion, the Court 
analyzed whether that right was broad enough to allow the tribe to 
exclude the OSHA inspectors.356 In doing so, it looked to an earlier 
Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Farris, which analyzed Article 
Two of the Treaty of Medicine Creek.357 
The Farris court had considered whether the treaty protected 
certain Puyallup Indians from federal prosecution for running an 
illegal gambling operation. While the court in Farris only 
considered the “exclusive use” component of Common Article 
Two,358 US DOL also described that court as having interpreted the 
bar on non-Indian residence.359 US DOL interpreted Farris to have 
“restricted the treaty rights exception to only subjects specifically 
covered in treaties, such as hunting rights.”360 Applying the Coeur 
d’Alene standard to its evaluation of the applicability of OSHA, US 
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DOL held that a “generalized right of exclusion may not be 
sufficient to bar application of [OSHA].”361 If the court held 
otherwise, “the enforcement of nearly all generally applicable 
federal laws would be nullified, thereby effectively rendering 
the…rule inapplicable to any tribe which has signed a Treaty 
containing a general exclusion provision.”362 
The cases interpreting the conflict between exclusion rights 
vary depending on whether they rely on Common Article Two or 
not.  Many of those that do not have involved the entry of federal 
officers acting on the basis of their limited statutory authority.363 In 
order to bar the entry of federal officers, treaty language must 
specifically speak to their exclusion.364 The Tenth Circuit found 
such language in the 1868 treaty with the Navajo Nation (the 
Nation).365 The Nation had signed that treaty with the United States 
after wars, numerous forced marches (remembered today as the 
Long Walk), and internment in the concentration camps of Bosque 
Redondo.366 The Nation had a specific interest in limiting the entry 
of settlers and federal officers “in order to achieve an end to conflict 
and ensure peace.”367 They, therefore, negotiated a treaty that 
permitted entry to only those “federal personnel…specifically so 
authorized to deal with Indian affairs.”368 This language “provid[ed] 
for specific exclusion rights over all persons” and, therefore, barred 
the applicability of a general statute such as OSHA.369 
Common Article Two was drafted with reference to a history 
and set of concerns distinct from those underlying the Navajo 
Treaty. As discussed above, the principle contention expressed by 
many Northwest tribes was with private settlers, not the federal 
government. By agreeing to move onto a reservation, where federal 
officers would help them, treaty negotiators intended, albeit under 
duress, to consent to the ultimate authority of the United States. 
Thus, Common Article Two laid out a cooperative scheme for the 
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right to exclude non-Indians that could be exercised by both the tribe 
and federal superintendent. Such language, as interpreted in US 
DOL, Farris, and Soaring Eagle, would be insufficient to allow for 
the exclusion of federal officers. Yet the right must stand for 
something, or it will present “an impotent outcome to negotiations 
and a convention which seemed to promise more, and give the word 
of the [United States] for more.”370 Common Article Two 
recognizes the right the Indian negotiators sought, the power to 
exclude private settlers who act without federal mandate from their 
reservations. To interpret the treaty so narrowly as to incapacitate 
the ability of tribes to exclude those private non-Indian individuals, 
even in the context of a statute protecting access to public 
accommodations, would render it a nullity.371 
2. Intrusion on Tribal Self-Governance  
in Intramural Affairs 
The second Coeur d’Alene exception bars a statute’s 
application if it would concern “exclusive rights of self-governance 
in purely intramural matters.”372 Intramural matters are those “such 
as conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic 
relations.”373 Notably, the operation of tribal commercial enterprises 
falls within such intramural matters.374 The Ninth Circuit, however, 
has suggested that tribal efforts to regulate non-intramural conduct 
may be sufficient to bar statutory application.375 If the tribe has 
regulated the conduct and the plaintiff has not exhausted his tribal 
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remedies pursuant to that regulation, application of the statute would 
intrude on tribal self-governance. 
Coeur d’Alene itself held that this exception was 
inapplicable to “[t]he operation of a farm that sells produce on the 
open market and in interstate commerce” because it was “not an 
aspect of tribal self-government.”376 Similarly, in Florida 
Paraplegic, the Eleventh Circuit found the tribal casino to be a 
normal “commercial enterprise.”377 
But the second Coeur d’Alene exception may be satisfied not 
only when statutory application would touch intramural conduct but 
also when it would intrude on tribal regulation of non-intramural 
conduct.378 In Solis v. Matheson, an Indian-owned retail store 
appealed the United States Department of Labor’s efforts to apply 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), arguing its operation was an 
intramural, tribal matter.379 The court easily dismissed this 
argument, for the store was a commercial enterprise not owned by 
the tribe and engaged in extensive employment of and commerce 
with both nonmembers and non-Indians.380 The court did, however, 
recognize that the tribe had a “strong interest as a sovereign in 
regulating economic activity involving its own members within its 
own territory.”381 The court suggested that application of federal 
law, therefore, could interfere with self-government not only by 
directly regulating governmental conduct but also by preempting 
tribal efforts to regulate non-governmental conduct.382 In the case 
under its review, the FLSA did not threaten such interference as the 
tribe “ha[d] not enacted wage and hour laws.”383 That result might 
have differed if the tribe had enacted such laws. 
Tribal regulation of casinos is illustrative of how exclusion 
from a commercial facility is used to regulate intramural activity. 
For example, chapter 17.05 of the Nisqually Tribal Code concerns 
procedures for barring a patron from the tribal casino. Pursuant to 
that chapter, the “Tribal Gaming Agency may bar a patron from the 
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casino if the Agency determines that the patron poses a threat to the 
safety or security of the gaming operation” based on its observation 
of the patron’s “behavior, recent criminal history or association with 
gangs or other criminal organizations.”384 The Agency cannot bar a 
patron based on criminal history alone without “other evidence to 
suggest that the person poses a threat to safety and security at the 
Casino.”385 The code provides aggrieved patrons an administrative 
remedy, allowing them to “appeal the barring or request a removal 
of the bar to the Tribal Gaming Commission.”386 The Tribal Gaming 
Commission is required to “restore the patron’s access to the Casino 
if it is determined that the patron is no longer a threat to the safety 
and security of the Casino.”387 While the preceding protections 
apply broadly to all patrons, only tribal members are entitled to 
restored access at the “earliest possible date” and cannot be 
permanently barred.388 
This hypothetical consideration of the ADA Title III’s 
relation to tribal exclusion actions teaches two important lessons 
regarding generally applicable federal laws and exclusion. First, 
courts must look carefully to treaty provisions pertaining to 
exclusive tribal use of the reservation. Interpretation of such 
provisions may differ depending on whether the excluded person is 
a private actor or a federal officer acting according to an official 
mandate. Second, courts must remember that concerns of tribal self-
government do not only arise when the site of exclusion is a 
governmental institution like public housing. Tribes have important 
and intramural governing concerns in regulating the adjudication of 
exclusion actions concerning nongovernmental spaces. Thus, the 
Coeur d’Alene test will preclude the application of federal 
accommodations law until the complainant has exhausted his tribal 
remedies to exclusion, unless a federal agency brings enforcement 
litigation. 
This article turns last to an issue gaining recent traction in 
the federal courts, the use of habeas corpus as a device to allow 
federal judicial intervention in exclusion decisions. 
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C. Habeas Corpus 
Increasingly, excluded persons have petitioned the federal 
courts to grant them writs of habeas corpus to challenge their 
exclusion. They ask for such relief under the Indian Civil Rights Act 
(ICRA). ICRA provides that the “privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus shall be available to any person in a court of the United 
States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian 
tribe.389 Congress guaranteed a broad panoply of rights under Title 
I of ICRA, including due process and equal protection in tribal court, 
but it provided a narrow opportunity for relief through habeas corpus 
alone.390 How it reached this result is detailed at length in the most 
important ICRA case, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.391 
In Martinez, Martinez famously challenged the Santa Clara 
Pueblo’s ordinance granting membership status to the children of 
mixed marriages when the father was a tribal member.392 She argued 
that the ordinance violated her children’s rights to equal protection 
under ICRA.393 
The United States Supreme Court considered whether ICRA 
provided such a cause of action. The Supreme Court explained that 
Congress had passed the ICRA with “[t]wo distinct and competing 
purposes,” the protection of individual civil liberties in the tribal 
context and the furtherance of tribal sovereignty.394 In doing so, it 
distinguished the “interference with tribal autonomy and self-
government” that would result by recognizing such a cause of action 
from the substantive changes ICRA mandated in tribal 
proceedings.395 
Congress had not intended to provide a federal forum to 
resolve disputes properly adjudicated within the tribe’s own 
bounds.396 The Supreme Court cited Congress’s rejection of an 
earlier bill that would have allowed de novo review of all tribal 
convictions, paying them less respect than federal agencies 
receive.397 The Court concluded that such a provision would 
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“deprive the tribal court[s] of all jurisdiction in the event of an 
appeal, thus having a harmful effect on law enforcement within the 
reservation,” because instead, Congress passed a law allowing only 
habeas corpus relief.398 Such a limitation indicated recognition by 
Congress “that resolution of statutory issues under [ICRA], and 
particularly those issues likely to arise in a civil context, will 
frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom which 
tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate than federal 
courts.”399 
By including the above limitation, ICRA preserves an 
important space in American jurisprudence for tribes to consider and 
adjudicate such compelling arguments on their own terms. As the 
Court explained, “Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as 
appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes 
affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians 
and non-Indians.”400 
In the decades following Martinez, a split has emerged 
between the Second and Ninth Circuits over whether the narrow 
window so carefully constrained by the higher court may be 
widened to embrace habeas corpus challenges to exclusion orders 
under ICRA. This section will discuss and critique the Second 
Circuit’s seminal decision in Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca 
Indians,401 which allowed for the issuance of habeas corpus relief in 
the exclusion context. The critique stems from numerous subsequent 
decisions by the Ninth Circuit and its subsidiary district courts. 
The Second Circuit decided Poodry in 1996.402 The 
Tonawanda Band had permanently excluded certain members of the 
Band’s Council of Chiefs after those members broke away and 
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formed their own competing government.403 Having characterized 
the petitioners’ formation of a competing council as an act of 
treason, the Tonawanda Band had sent groups of fifteen to twenty-
five people to demand the members’ immediate removal.404 Those 
excluded sued in federal court, arguing that their exclusion 
constituted a detention triggering ICRA’s habeas corpus 
provision.405 The Second Circuit concluded that it did. In reaching 
this conclusion, the court explained that petitioners had met the three 
requirements for habeas relief: there was (1) a criminal sanction, (2) 
sufficient detention, and (3) an exhaustion of all other available 
remedies. 
Analysis of these three elements in Poodry and the Ninth 
Circuit’s responses are instructive. 
1. A Criminal Sanction 
Regarding the first requirement for habeas relief, the Second 
Circuit held habeas relief directed against a separate sovereign was 
likely available only in the criminal context.406 However, the Second 
Circuit explained that whether a relevant sentence was criminal or 
civil depended on the Anglo-American heritage of the habeas writ 
rather than tribal tradition.407 It noted that exclusion had “clearly and 
historically been punitive in nature.”408 Faced with conflicting 
testimony on whether exclusion was viewed as civil or criminal in 
tribal custom, the court relied on Anglo-American common law to 
conclude it was criminal for the purposes of habeas corpus relief.409 
Exclusion is a fundamentally civil proceeding as recognized under 
most tribal laws and under Supreme Court precedent. Yet the writ 
of habeas corpus is designed to provide relief from criminal 
detention. 
Drawing on Poodry, the District Court for the District of 
Oregon reconciled this contradiction in Alire v. Jackson.410 The 
Second Circuit had confronted an exclusion ordered in direct 
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response to alleged acts of treason. While allowing that habeas 
review might extend beyond cases involving a criminal conviction, 
it had to “ar[i]se in a criminal context.”411 In the Oregon case, the 
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation had excluded 
a nonmember caregiver previously convicted in tribal court of 
children under her care.412 It was not until several months later, 
however, that many tribal members petitioned successfully for the 
tribal council to exclude her.413 The district court reasoned that her 
exclusion lacked the close temporal nexus to a criminal proceeding 
described in Poodry.414 As such, the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain her petition for habeas corpus. 
The District Court for the Eastern District of California, 
however, disagreed. In Quair v. Sisco, it considered an exclusion 
ordered absent an underlying criminal prosecution.415 Although the 
court considered the relevant facts at extraordinary length, it 
concluded that “the imposition of [exclusion] renders…proceedings 
criminal [per se] for purposes of habeas corpus relief.”416 
This conclusion departs from Poodry and Martinez and 
disables tribes in exercising perhaps their only tool to combat 
lawlessness within their reservations without federal interference. 
The Alire rule requiring a close temporal nexus between a criminal 
proceeding and the exclusion order furthers the purposes of ICRA 
to provide federal relief in the most extreme cases while protecting 
the Act’s goal of aggrandizing tribal sovereignty. Other districts 
should adopt the Alire rule so as to provide a forum to persons 
improperly detained in criminal contexts without further carving 
away at the fragile civil jurisdiction of tribes. 
2. Sufficiency of Detention 
Returning to Poodry, the Second Circuit considered whether 
permanent exclusion effected a detention within the meaning of 
ICRA. Detention, the Supreme Court had held, did not require actual 
physical custody.417 Rather, it required “severe restraints on 
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individual liberty.”418 A “short-lived suspension of privileges” was 
not severe enough to suffice.419 The exclusion of the petitioners, 
however, was sufficient. The Second Circuit cited the forceful 
groups sent to demand removal, accompanying assaults, the denial 
of electrical service to the petitioners, and their disenrollment to 
justify exclusion.420 Though the petitioners had not yet been 
removed, they lived under the uncertainty of not knowing “if, when, 
or how their sentences [would] be executed.”421 The court 
analogized this state of uncertainty to that of American citizens 
ordered denaturalized though not yet deported, whose rights to 
petition for habeas corpus had long been recognized.422 Like the 
denaturalized, the excluded faced the loss of cultural, economic, and 
social ties with their nation.423 
The Ninth Circuit distinguished and rejected Poodry’s 
understanding of detention in Tavares v. Whitehouse.424 Disagreeing 
with internal governance decisions, certain members of the United 
Auburn Indian Community submitted their grievances to the mass 
media to accuse the tribal council of fraud in tribal financial 
matters.425 They alleged to the media that the tribe and its enterprises 
were not “stable partner[s] for business.”426 
In response, the United Auburn Indian Community tribal 
council banned these members temporarily from tribal lands and 
facilities for slandering the tribal government in non-tribal fora.427 
The exclusion orders were issued for between two and ten years.428 
Yet the petitioners maintained the right to vote by absentee ballot in 
tribal elections.429 They kept their medical benefits.430 None of the 
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petitioners were disenrolled.431 They could still access private lands 
within the reservation.432 
The members had received no right to hearing or appeal,433 
so the tribal members took their claim to federal court and filed for 
habeas corpus relief under ICRA. The district court dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the exclusions 
did not rise to the level of a “detention” sufficient to warrant relief 
under ICRA.434 
Affirming that order, the Ninth Circuit distinguished ICRA’s 
limited relief to petitioners in “detention” with the federal courts’ 
broader jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus writs to petitioners “in 
[the] custody” of federal and state authorities.435 The Ninth Circuit 
explained that when Congress passed ICRA, detention was 
understood to constitute a narrow subset of custody.436 Custody 
referred to “physical control of the person” with or without physical 
confinement,437 but detention specifically required physical 
confinement.438 The Ninth Circuit then held that three reasons 
precluded the exercise of habeas jurisdiction under ICRA. 
First, unlike those presented in Poodry, these exclusions 
were temporary.439 Even the Second Circuit itself had limited 
Poodry in this matter. In Shenandoah v. United States Department 
of the Interior, it held that temporary exclusion orders presented an 
insufficient limitation on the petitioner’s liberty to support habeas 
corpus jurisdiction.440 
Second, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[i]n many cases, a 
tribe’s decision to temporarily exclude a member will be another 
expression of its sovereign authority to determine the makeup of the 
community.”441 The federal courts lacked jurisdiction to review 
such determinations, and thus it was not proper to include exclusion 
within the definition of “detention.”442 
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Third, habeas corpus relief was improper because it would 
interfere with the authority to exclude nonmembers, as recognized 
in Merrion.443 But the court also clarified that inherent sovereignty 
supported the exclusion of members and nonmembers alike.444 
Considering these reasons and the interpretive canon 
requiring that ambiguous statutes be construed to favor tribal 
sovereignty, the Ninth Circuit concluded that when Congress used 
the word “detention,” it had not meant to include exclusion orders, 
at least when temporary in duration.445 To the extent that the 
petitioners brought meritorious claims, the proper remedy must be 
sought in tribal court, not in recourse to the federal courts.446 
Tavares provides a persuasive outer limit for federal court 
intervention. The writ of habeas corpus is justly extraordinary. 
While the availability of such relief is integral to maintaining the 
rule of law, the interference it represents becomes problematic when 
applied by the colonizer against the governments of the colonized. 
Therefore, courts should be extremely reluctant to grant such writs 
and should not do so where exclusion is only temporary. To act 
otherwise would be a retreat from the Court in Martinez’s stand 
against federal intrusion into tribal affairs. As the Ninth Circuit 
noted, the canons of construction, properly established to protect 
tribal sovereignty, urge that ICRA’s ambiguities be interpreted 
against this intrusion. The Second Circuit, by contrast, relied on 
general habeas corpus law, not habeas corpus principles particular 
to the Indian law context. 
Further, Tavares explained why federal courts should 
hesitate to review even the exclusion of members, stating that such 
review might lead to interference with the decision to exclude 
nonmembers.447 Courts should carefully guard against such 
interference. The Poodry court, based on its facts and its citation to 
denaturalization cases, construed exclusion as a loss of national and 
political identity.448 While exclusion may force nonmembers to 
forsake certain social or employment ties, it does not entail the 
corresponding loss of homeland. Thus, Alire distinguished Poodry 
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from the nonmember in its own case who had “not been stripped of 
her Indian name, her lands, her tribal citizenship, or her tribal 
membership, nor has she been [excluded] from her own tribe’s 
reservation or territory.”449 Similarly Quair held that the excluded 
petitioners were detained because their exclusion was coupled with 
disenrollment; the court contrasted the petitioners with excluded 
nonmembers who would not face such a double harm.450 Such a 
holding conforms to the purpose of exclusion as a recognized treaty 
right: controlling the entry of nonmembers in order to ensure the 
peace and welfare of a tribe. 
To conclude otherwise would turn ICRA into a hammer, 
battering away at the sovereign boundaries of Indian country. 
Further, courts considering petitions for habeas corpus filed by 
excluded nonmembers should distinguish Poodry. The Second 
Circuit in that case held that exclusion was a sufficiently severe 
restraint on liberty to trigger habeas corpus because it worked a 
“destruction of [the petitioners’] social, cultural, and political 
existence.”451 It reached this conclusion in explicit rejection of the 
dissent’s argument that ICRA served to provide relief from 
restraints on liberties shared by the American public and not those 
enjoyed specifically by tribal members.452 
Additionally, its analogy to the denaturalization of American 
citizens loses all sense if applied to persons deprived of a 
membership they never had. The American public has, pursuant to 
Merrion, Cherokee Nation, and associated cases, no right to settle 
or trespass on Indian lands. 
In contrast, the consequences of exclusion for members are 
grave. The excluded may lose the right to attend important family 
and ceremonial functions.453 They lose the right to certain services 
and political rights.454 Perhaps most importantly they may lose a 
great degree of respect.455 The petitioners in Tavares complained 
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that elders amongst their members had lost the right to access 
services reserved to elders, and others alleged that they were treated 
as “criminals or untouchables.”456 Similarly, a woman facing 
exclusion on the Lummi reservation after her son, who was listed on 
her lease, was convicted of drug-dealing, described the experience 
as “[s]piritually…tak[ing] your insides and turn[ing] them inside 
out.”457 
In sum, Tavares sets the best example for lower courts to 
follow. Lower courts should hold that exclusion does not effect a 
detention necessary for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, 
especially when the exclusion is temporary, directed against 
nonmembers, or implicates tribal decisions regarding membership. 
The harms not only of exclusion but also of impairing its use are 
grave and best resolved by tribal governments. For this reason, 
lower federal courts have looked to what remedies tribes may offer. 
3. Availability of Tribal Remedies 
Returning to Poodry, as discussed further below, the court 
recognized that the tribe allowed no other remedies, explaining that 
“there is no tribal review available in the circumstances of this 
case.”458 Absent federal habeas review, the excluded would have 
“no remedy whatsoever.”459 Thus, tribes should offer the excluded 
the option of review. 
Sweet v. Hintzman,460 the first exclusion case to proceed to 
federal trial, illustrates this necessity. Here, the Snoqualmie council 
had preliminarily excluded certain members who had established a 
shadow government to replace the established government.461 After 
that, the council provided improper notice to the excluded.462 It 
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changed the time and date of the exclusion hearing many times.463 
It notified the excluded only as to the city in which the proceeding 
would take place.464 When the excluded learned more details by 
word of mouth and appeared to testify, they were denied entry to the 
venue by tribally contracted police officers.465 The excluded waited 
several hours before they left frustrated at the denial of their right to 
testify.466 The trial provided further opportunity to question whether 
ICRA was properly interpreted by federal or tribal law. The 
excluded members argued that federal constitutional law ought to 
control while the tribe pointed to tribal statute and traditions of 
exclusion from the remote and recent pasts.467 
Counsel in Sweet, Rob Roy Smith, has speculated that these 
courts may have dismissed legal actions for lack of jurisdiction if 
they saw “due process or a functioning tribal court” permitting the 
excluded to seek an internal tribal review of the exclusions.468 
Similarly, the Eastern District of California concluded that 
exhaustion of remedies to exclusion is futile in the absence of a tribal 
court.469 
However, courts considering whether such remedies satisfy 
due process should take a narrow purview, upholding the strict 
requirements of ICRA without coercing tribal governments to 
restructure. As discussed above, tribal courts have vigilantly upheld 
the proper procedures of exclusion, and the federal courts should 
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defer to those procedures. But when tribal courts lack the power to 
review exclusion orders, the tribes risk swift and far reaching federal 
intervention that may infringe upon sovereignty.  
Sweet provides an example of a federal court that insisted on 
a minimum of due process but remained deferential to tribal 
government in structuring how due process would operate.470 As 
such, it provides guidance to tribes worried about federal 
intervention. The petitioners were challenging their exclusion by 
petitioning the tribal council.471 The court also held that the notice 
provided was insufficient to satisfy due process. Under such facts, 
the court granted the first writ of habeas corpus since Martinez was 
decided. In doing so, it carefully limited its order: 
[It] refuse[d] Petitioners’ invitation to determine 
whether the charges against them were or were not 
false…[and] decline[d] Petitioners’ request to 
determine what rules and procedures regarding 
[exclusion] Respondents either had in place or 
should have had in place. The court also [would] not 
determine whether Respondents followed the rules 
and procedures they had in place or whether they 
should have followed certain other rules and 
procedures. Beyond determining whether or not 
Petitioners were provided with notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, the court [did] not believe it 
should delve into the inner workings of the 
[exclusion] process.472 
Not only will the establishment of the measures lacking in Sweet 
dissuade federal court intervention, it will also provide meaningful 
civil rights to tribal members.473 
Rob Roy Smith recommends two steps establishing a system 
of administrative and judicial review. First, tribes should provide an 
administrative mechanism of review to allow tribal executives and 
legislatures to reconsider exclusion decisions.474 Second, tribes 
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should ensure “the existence of a fully functioning independent 
tribal court system” to review those administrative decisions.475 Of 
course, this two-step model is only instructive and those operating 
in accordance with the model should defer to the plurality of tribal 
legal traditions.476 Even if this process is properly informed by tribal 
tradition, ICRA requires any resultant system of review to provide 
for procedural protections, such as notice and hearing. 
Courts considering the issuance of habeas corpus writs 
should be careful to avoid providing substantive direction to tribes. 
Habeas corpus relief under section 1303 of ICRA is limited to 
correcting infringements of rights under § 1302, as interpreted under 
tribal law. The appropriate consequence of a petition for habeas 
corpus, therefore, should never be a direction to readmit the 
excluded or reenroll the disenrolled. Rather, courts should remand 
such matters so such infringments can be reevaluated in tribal court 
in accordance with tribal law.477 At the time of ICRA’s passage, 
Congress noted that ICRA “should not be considered as the final 
solution to the many serious constitutional problems confronting the 
American Indian.”478 While this statement shows only a partial view 
of the good work underway in Indian country, it reflects the contest 
between federal courts and tribes to solve those problems where they 
still arise. Tribes can take the lead by establishing processes for the 
review of exclusion decisions that better comply with ICRA. 
Just as courts should be slow to direct substantive results on 
the issuance of habeas corpus, they should also be quick to accept 
tribal efforts to remedy procedural deficiencies on remand. In Quair, 
the District Court for the Eastern District of California held that it 
was unclear whether the tribe had adequately protected the due 
process rights of the excluded.479 Following the district court’s 
order, the tribe’s general council notified the excluded petitioners 
that it would hold a rehearing to reconsider the exclusion.480 It 
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informed the petitioners that they would have the right to counsel at 
the hearing as well as the right to present and cross-examine 
witnesses.481 The petitioners refused to attend, arguing that such a 
hearing would still violate ICRA as the tribe lacked a court with 
formal judicial procedures.482 In the petitioners’ absence, the general 
council again voted to exclude the petitioners.483 
Reviewing the matter again, the Eastern District of 
California held the newly provided measures likely to be 
adequate.484 The court also recognized that they differed from 
Anglo-American due process.485 Namely, the tribe’s general 
council, constituting its entire membership, had combined 
executive, legislative, and judicial functions.486 Further, the tribe 
had no written standards to govern the procedure of exclusion.487  
On these bases, the disenrolled petitioners contended that the 
tribe had violated ICRA per se, but the court refused to enter a per 
se analysis.488 Rather it employed a test promulgated by the Ninth 
Circuit in Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court.489 Under the 
Randall test, a court considering a tribal procedural matrix that 
“differ[s] significantly from those ‘commonly employed in Anglo-
Saxon society’” must “weigh ‘the individual right to fair treatment’ 
against ‘the magnitude of the tribal interest’ [in employing these 
procedures] to determine whether the procedures pass muster under 
[ICRA].”490 Such an approach best serves to “guarantee that tribal 
governments respect civil rights while minimizing federal 
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interference with tribal culture and tradition.”491 Because the 
petitioners in Quair made no argument why their interests 
outweighed those of the tribe in maintaining its independent 
procedures, the court denied their petition for habeas relief.492 
In sum, tribes should continue developing and protecting due 
process rights of the excluded. As seen throughout this article, tribes 
have done just that. Their lawmakers have crafted elaborate 
exclusion codes that establish certain due process rights and their 
courts have interpreted these to protect those facing exclusion. 
Tribes, cognizant of their unique challenges and strengths, their 
traditions and histories, are best equipped to define due process in 
this context. Accordingly, federal courts should narrowly construe 
ICRA to avoid impairing tribal efforts to do justice. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The power to exclude is by no means a panacea to the 
challenges facing Indian country. An example, drawn again from 
Alaska, is illustrative. Derek Adams grew up in his Yup’ik home 
village of Nunam Iqua.493 He suffered neglect from his mother and 
abuse from his father.494 He took to beating and burning dogs 
because he was angry that he had “never got[ten] to experience what 
every other kid got to experience with their parents.”495 In 2012, he 
shot his father.496 The elder Adams and his girlfriend had been 
drinking homebrew when the father, driven by jealous paranoia, 
threatened to kill his girlfriend and burn Derek in his house.497 
Derek, who was frightened, reacted in violence.498 
In 2013, Derek was drunk too.499 He went to a village 
hangout but could not get in. He smoked a cigarette and failed to put 
it out.500 The building caught fire, burning three people, including 
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Derek’s godfather and an eight-year-old boy to death.501 Nunam 
Iqua banished him for life.502 He moved to the neighboring village 
of Emmonak.503 The elder city manager told him he was “not a bad 
person…[but] a good person [with]…a chance to make a change in 
[his] life.”504 He told him to “[t]ake it from here” before banishing 
him as well.505 Derek ended up as a day laborer in Bethel, hungry, 
homeless, and alone.506 
Easy answers do not exist in a case like Derek’s. Exclusion 
is particularly powerful medicine because it undermines an equally 
powerful asset for tribal members: community belonging. Substance 
abuse denied Derek a fair childhood and led him down a path of 
recklessness, violence, and isolation. But that abuse and its 
consequences, along with the absence of law enforcement resources 
from within or without the village’s tribal government, made 
exclusion necessary. 
The cases discussed throughout this article show the severity 
of exclusion, but they also show its vital utility to tribes working to 
protect their communities. Tribes have carefully applied this power, 
both since time immemorial and in modern legislation tailored to 
their needs and the impact of applicable federal law. They have 
interpreted this legislation in their courts to protect the civil due 
process rights of the excluded. These examples provide not only 
inspiration to other tribal lawmakers, but a caution to non-tribal 
authorities that would try to intervene and subvert tribal sovereignty. 
The courts have recognized the necessity of exclusion since 
the founding years of the American Republic. They have 
concordantly affirmed the same sovereign power in tribal 
governments, possessed since time immemorial, as an incident of 
the sovereign police authority. Additionally, the United States 
entered treaties affirming that power. 
But policies of allotment changed all that. Since Congress 
embarked on that policy and began dicing the tribal land base, the 
courts have become less consistent. Thus, cases like Merrion and 
Brendale recognize the basic connection of the exclusion authority 








to tribal sovereignty, but others like Montana and Strate reduce it to 
a stick in the private landowner’s bundle of rights. 
For their part, the political branches have tried to mitigate 
the judicial assault on the exclusion power. The United States 
Attorneys for two districts have brought the might of the federal 
government to support tribal exclusion orders, and Congress has 
reaffirmed tribal jurisdiction over domestic violence and may do the 
same over drug crimes and violence towards children. The 
Department of Justice should issue guidance requiring that Assistant 
United States Attorneys charge exclusion order violations as 
trespasses under state law or else draft and submit memoranda 
justifying their declination. 
Yet change must come in the judiciary. The schizophrenic 
nature of existing precedent provides the courts with the tools to 
recognize a broader tribal power of exclusion. They can return to a 
recognition of this right as an incident of sovereign police authority. 
Or they can strongly affirm its support in the Montana exceptions. 
Additionally, courts should be slow to apply federal 
accommodations statutes that would impair sovereign tribal 
exclusion authority. And when petitioned to issue writs of habeas 
corpus, those courts should defer to tribal procedural mechanisms 
and avoid imposing substantive requirements on tribal governance. 
Such statutes and the possibility of habeas corpus relief may 
advance important policy goals, but those goals are best pursued 
through tribal governance, reflecting the will of tribal communities 
and the strength of tribal sovereignty. 
